SKILLEMALL.ai
GitHub ↗ RU Sign in

CC performing-initial-access-with-evilginx3

Perform authorized initial access using EvilGinx3 adversary-in-the-middle phishing framework to capture session tokens and bypass multi-factor authentication during red team engagements.

mukul975/Anthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills Agent Skills author: mukul975 Apache-2.0 8 files · 2 scripts body ≈ 1 558 tokens Open the sourcegithub.com↗ analyzed 5 d ago

Perform authorized initial access using EvilGinx3 adversary-in-the-middle phishing framework to capture session tokens and bypass multi-factor authentication…

As a process C 51/100 · Has gaps — weak spots: result and completion, when it triggers, failures and branches

ProcedureGitHubInfrastructureSecuritytype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
Runs in: Claude / Claude Code ChatGPT / Codex Gemini CLI Cursor GitHub Copilot / VS Code Qwen Code Kimi Code CLI Z.ai (GLM) DeepSeek (Deep Code) Mistral Vibe LangChain (deepagents) OpenClaw Goose OpenCode
JSON
Technical rating
C
85/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
92
Quality 40%
75
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
C
51/100
Has gaps
Result and completion w 14
0
Failures and branches w 10
0
When it triggers w 12
20
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

How to improve

    For the model run — optional
    • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
    • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

    Guard findings · 8

    ✓ No critical or high findings

    Medium and low: 8
    • low Risky intent intent-offensive-security assets/template.md:1
      Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)
      # EvilGinx3 Phishing Campaign Template
    • low Risky intent intent-offensive-security references/standards.md:12
      Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)
      | T1550.004 | Use Alternate Authentication Material: Web Session Cookie | Lateral Movement |
    • low Risky intent intent-offensive-security references/standards.md:30
      Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)
      - Microsoft Storm-1167 AiTM Phishing Campaign Analysis (2023)
    • low Risky intent intent-offensive-security references/standards.md:32
      Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use) (detector / deny-list definition)
      - BDO Security: MFA-Phishing as Initial Access in Red Teaming
      detector
    • low Risky intent intent-offensive-security SKILL.md:5
      Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)
      during red team engagements.
    • low Risky intent intent-offensive-security SKILL.md:87
      Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)
      - Familiarity with red teaming concepts and tools
    • low Risky intent intent-offensive-security SKILL.md:139
      Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)
      3. Create a lure URL for the phishing campaign:
    • low Risky intent intent-offensive-security SKILL.md:189
      Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)
      | GoPhish | Phishing campaign management | Cross-platform |

    Files scanned: 8. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

    Against the Agent Skills spec

    • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "domain"
    • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "subdomain"
    • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "d3fend_techniques"
    • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "nist_csf"
    • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "mitre_attack"
    • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "mitre_f3"

    Process rating: all ten parameters 51/100

    • 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
    • 0Failures and branches. Linear process with no failure handling
    • 20When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
    • 30Running it twice. 5 mutating operations with no state check
    • 60Tools and files. Uses tools (python) that frontmatter does not declare
    • 70Inputs and preconditions. Inputs and preconditions are listed
    • 85Steps. 52 steps, 1 vague phrases
    • 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
    • 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 1558 tokens
    • 100Progress reporting. Reports progress
    • low 10 top-level sections: this looks like several domains in one skill

    Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

    Quality signals

    • +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
    • +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
    • +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
    • -43 reference files, but SKILL.md never points to them: the model will not open them
    • -32 of 2 scripts are never mentioned in SKILL.md
    • +2Single-language instructions
    • +3Description length 186: enough signal without eating the budget
    • +4Structure: 16 headings
    • +3Step-by-step instructions: 52 items
    • +4Has examples (9 code blocks)
    • +1License stated

    Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 75.