BB performing-ios-app-security-assessment
Performs comprehensive iOS application security assessments using Frida for dynamic instrumentation, Objection for runtime exploration, SSL pinning bypass for traffic interception, keychain extraction for credential analysis, and IPA static analysis for binary-level review. Use when conducting authorized iOS penetration tests, evaluating mobile app security posture against OWASP MASTG, or assessing iOS app data protection and transport security controls. Activates for requests involving iOS app pentesting, Frida-based iOS instrumentation, mobile app SSL pinning bypass, or IPA reverse engineering.
Performs comprehensive iOS application security assessments using Frida for dynamic instrumentation, Objection for runtime exploration, SSL pinning bypass for…
As a process B 66/100 · Nearly there — weak spots: failures and branches, progress reporting
How to improve
- Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
- A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.
Guard findings · 3
✓ No critical or high findings
Medium and low: 3
-
low Risky intent
intent-offensive-securityreferences/api-reference.md:5Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)Automates iOS application security testing using Frida dynamic instrumentation, Objection runtime exploration, SSL pinning bypass, keychain extraction, and IPA static analysis. Covers OWASP MASVS cate
-
low Risky intent
intent-offensive-securitySKILL.md:9Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)involving iOS app pentesting, Frida-based iOS instrumentation, mobile app SSL pinning
-
low Risky intent
intent-offensive-securitySKILL.md:43Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)This skill is intended for authorized security testing, penetration testing engagements, CTF competitions, and educational purposes only. Unauthorized access to applications or devices is illegal. Alw
Files scanned: 4. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.
Against the Agent Skills spec
- note
frontmatter-keyunknown frontmatter key "domain" - note
frontmatter-keyunknown frontmatter key "subdomain" - note
frontmatter-keyunknown frontmatter key "nist_csf" - note
frontmatter-keyunknown frontmatter key "mitre_attack"
Process rating: all ten parameters 66/100
- 0Failures and branches. Linear process with no failure handling
- 0Progress reporting. Says nothing while it works
- 50When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
- 60Tools and files. Uses tools (python) that frontmatter does not declare
- 60Result and completion. Output format stated, no completion criterion
- 70Inputs and preconditions. Inputs and preconditions are listed
- 100Steps. 27 steps
- 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
- 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 2712 tokens
- 100Running it twice. No mutating operations
Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.
Quality signals
- +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
- -41 reference files, but SKILL.md never points to them: the model will not open them
- -31 of 1 scripts are never mentioned in SKILL.md
- +2Single-language instructions
- +4Description says when NOT to use the skill
- +3Description length 603: enough signal without eating the budget
- +4Structure: 16 headings
- +3Step-by-step instructions: 27 items
- +3Output format is stated explicitly
- +4Has examples (8 code blocks)
- +1License stated
Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 82.