CC performing-kerberoasting-attack
Perform Kerberoasting, a post-exploitation technique that enumerates Active Directory service accounts with Service Principal Names (SPNs), requests their Kerberos TGS tickets, and cracks the NTLM-encrypted tickets offline to recover service account credentials. Use during authorized red team engagements or penetration tests to assess AD privilege escalation and credential access risk from weak service account passwords.
Perform Kerberoasting, a post-exploitation technique that enumerates Active Directory service accounts with Service Principal Names (SPNs), requests their…
As a process C 54/100 · Has gaps — weak spots: result and completion, when it triggers, failures and branches
How to improve
- Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
- A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.
Guard findings · 4
✓ No critical or high findings
Medium and low: 4
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low Risky intent
intent-offensive-securitySKILL.md:6Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)service account credentials. Use during authorized red team engagements or penetration
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low Risky intent
intent-offensive-securitySKILL.md:7Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)tests to assess AD privilege escalation and credential access risk from weak service
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low Risky intent
intent-offensive-securitySKILL.md:47Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use) (quoted — discussed, not commanded)Kerberoasting is a post-exploitation technique that targets service accounts in Active Directory by requesting Kerberos TGS (Ticket Granting Service) tickets for accounts with Service Principal Names
quoted -
low Risky intent
intent-offensive-securitySKILL.md:59Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)- Familiarity with red teaming concepts and tools
Files scanned: 8. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.
Against the Agent Skills spec
- note
frontmatter-keyunknown frontmatter key "domain" - note
frontmatter-keyunknown frontmatter key "subdomain" - note
frontmatter-keyunknown frontmatter key "d3fend_techniques" - note
frontmatter-keyunknown frontmatter key "nist_csf" - note
frontmatter-keyunknown frontmatter key "mitre_attack"
Process rating: all ten parameters 54/100
- 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
- 0Failures and branches. Linear process with no failure handling
- 0Progress reporting. Says nothing while it works
- 20When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
- 60Tools and files. Uses tools (bash, python) that frontmatter does not declare
- 70Inputs and preconditions. Inputs and preconditions are listed
- 100Steps. 36 steps
- 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
- 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 868 tokens
- 100Running it twice. No mutating operations
Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.
Quality signals
- +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
- +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
- +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
- +4No input/output examples
- -43 reference files, but SKILL.md never points to them: the model will not open them
- -32 of 2 scripts are never mentioned in SKILL.md
- +2Single-language instructions
- +3Description length 424: enough signal without eating the budget
- +4Structure: 13 headings
- +3Step-by-step instructions: 36 items
- +1License stated
Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 71.