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CC performing-kubernetes-penetration-testing

Evaluates Kubernetes cluster security by actively simulating attacker techniques against the API server, kubelet, etcd, pods, RBAC, network policy, and secrets, using kube-hunter, Kubescape, peirates, and manual kubectl exploitation to find paths to cluster compromise. Use for an authorized penetration test or hands-on validation that controls actually stop an attacker. Keywords: kube-hunter, Kubescape, peirates, kubelet 10250, anonymous auth, token theft, lateral movement, cluster takeover. Do not use for a configuration-only compliance audit - use performing-kubernetes-cis-benchmark-with-kube-bench.

mukul975/Anthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills Agent Skills author: mukul975 Apache-2.0 8 files · 2 scripts body ≈ 1 949 tokens Open the sourcegithub.com↗ analyzed 5 d ago

Evaluates Kubernetes cluster security by actively simulating attacker techniques against the API server, kubelet, etcd, pods, RBAC, network policy, and…

As a process C 57/100 · Has gaps — weak spots: result and completion, failures and branches, running it twice

AnalyzerKubernetesGitHubAI and agentsSecuritytype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
Runs in: Claude / Claude Code ChatGPT / Codex Gemini CLI Cursor GitHub Copilot / VS Code Qwen Code Kimi Code CLI Z.ai (GLM) DeepSeek (Deep Code) Mistral Vibe LangChain (deepagents) OpenClaw Goose OpenCode
JSON
Technical rating
C
83/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
86
Quality 40%
79
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
C
57/100
Has gaps
Result and completion w 14
0
Failures and branches w 10
0
Running it twice w 4
30
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

How to improve

    For the model run — optional
    • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
    • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

    Guard findings · 14

    ✓ No critical or high findings

    Medium and low: 14
    • low Risky intent intent-offensive-security assets/template.md:1
      Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)
      # Kubernetes Penetration Test Report Template
    • low Risky intent intent-offensive-security references/api-reference.md:1
      Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)
      # API Reference — Performing Kubernetes Penetration Testing
    • low Risky intent intent-offensive-security references/standards.md:1
      Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)
      # Standards Reference - Kubernetes Penetration Testing
    • low Risky intent intent-offensive-security references/standards.md:10
      Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)
      | T1611 | Escape to Host | Privilege Escalation |
    • low Risky intent intent-offensive-security references/workflows.md:1
      Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)
      # Workflows - Kubernetes Penetration Testing
    • low Risky intent intent-offensive-security references/workflows.md:3
      Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)
      ## Workflow 1: External Kubernetes Pentest
    • low Risky intent intent-offensive-security references/workflows.md:54
      Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)
      Step 3: Privilege Escalation
    • low Risky intent intent-offensive-security references/workflows.md:60
      Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)
      Step 4: Lateral Movement
    • low Risky intent intent-offensive-security references/workflows.md:72
      Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)
      ## Workflow 3: Pentest Cleanup
    • low Risky intent intent-offensive-security SKILL.md:7
      Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)
      Use for an authorized penetration test or hands-on validation that controls actually stop an
    • low Risky intent intent-offensive-security SKILL.md:9
      Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)
      theft, lateral movement, cluster takeover. Do not use for a configuration-only compliance
    • low Risky intent intent-offensive-security SKILL.md:33
      Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)
      # Performing Kubernetes Penetration Testing
    • low Risky intent intent-offensive-security SKILL.md:37
      Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)
      Kubernetes penetration testing systematically evaluates cluster security by simulating attacker techniques against the API server, kubelet, etcd, pods, RBAC, network policies, and secrets. Using tools
    • low Risky intent intent-offensive-security SKILL.md:42
      Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)
      - When conducting security assessments that involve performing kubernetes penetration testing

    Files scanned: 8. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

    Against the Agent Skills spec

    • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "domain"
    • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "subdomain"
    • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "nist_csf"
    • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "mitre_attack"

    Process rating: all ten parameters 57/100

    • 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
    • 0Failures and branches. Linear process with no failure handling
    • 30Running it twice. 1 mutating operations with no state check
    • 50When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
    • 60Tools and files. Uses tools (node) that frontmatter does not declare
    • 70Inputs and preconditions. Inputs and preconditions are listed
    • 100Steps. 14 steps
    • 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
    • 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 1949 tokens
    • 100Progress reporting. Reports progress

    Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

    Quality signals

    • +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
    • +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
    • -43 reference files, but SKILL.md never points to them: the model will not open them
    • -32 of 2 scripts are never mentioned in SKILL.md
    • +2Single-language instructions
    • +4Description says when NOT to use the skill
    • +3Description length 608: enough signal without eating the budget
    • +4Structure: 18 headings
    • +3Step-by-step instructions: 14 items
    • +4Has examples (9 code blocks)
    • +1License stated

    Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 79.