CC performing-lateral-movement-detection
Detects lateral movement techniques including Pass-the-Hash, PsExec, WMI execution, RDP pivoting, and SMB-based spreading by correlating Windows Security/Sysmon event logs, network flow data (NetFlow/Zeek), and endpoint telemetry in a SIEM, mapped to MITRE ATT&CK Lateral Movement (TA0008) techniques with sample SPL detection queries. Use when a SOC team needs to detect attackers pivoting between internal systems after initial compromise, trace an attacker's movement path during an incident investigation, or build detection engineering rules for TA0008; not for detecting initial access or external attacks.
Detects lateral movement techniques including Pass-the-Hash, PsExec, WMI execution, RDP pivoting, and SMB-based spreading by correlating Windows…
As a process C 63/100 · Has gaps — weak spots: failures and branches, running it twice, progress reporting
How to improve
- Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
- A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.
Guard findings · 9
✓ No critical or high findings
Medium and low: 9
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low Risky intent
intent-offensive-securityreferences/api-reference.md:1Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)# API Reference: Lateral Movement Detection
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low Risky intent
intent-offensive-securityreferences/api-reference.md:21Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)| 10 | Process access (LSASS credential dumping) |
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low Risky intent
intent-offensive-securityreferences/api-reference.md:44Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)- MITRE ATT&CK Lateral Movement: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0008/
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low Risky intent
intent-offensive-securityreferences/api-reference.md:46Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use) (detector / deny-list definition)- Sigma rules (lateral movement): https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma
detector -
low Risky intent
intent-offensive-securitySKILL.md:3Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use) (detector / deny-list definition)description: 'Detects lateral movement techniques including Pass-the-Hash, PsExec,
detector -
low Risky intent
intent-offensive-securitySKILL.md:6Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)mapped to MITRE ATT&CK Lateral Movement (TA0008) techniques with sample SPL detection
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low Risky intent
intent-offensive-securitySKILL.md:46Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)# Performing Lateral Movement Detection
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low Risky intent
intent-offensive-securitySKILL.md:53Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use) (detector / deny-list definition)- Detection engineering needs lateral movement rules mapped to ATT&CK TA0008 techniques
detector -
low Risky intent
intent-offensive-securitySKILL.md:54Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)- Red/purple team exercises identify lateral movement detection gaps
Files scanned: 4. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.
Against the Agent Skills spec
- note
frontmatter-keyunknown frontmatter key "domain" - note
frontmatter-keyunknown frontmatter key "subdomain" - note
frontmatter-keyunknown frontmatter key "d3fend_techniques" - note
frontmatter-keyunknown frontmatter key "nist_csf" - note
frontmatter-keyunknown frontmatter key "mitre_attack"
Process rating: all ten parameters 63/100
- 0Failures and branches. Linear process with no failure handling
- 0Progress reporting. Says nothing while it works
- 30Running it twice. 2 mutating operations with no state check
- 50When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
- 60Tools and files. Uses tools (bash) that frontmatter does not declare
- 60Result and completion. Output format stated, no completion criterion
- 70Inputs and preconditions. Inputs and preconditions are listed
- 100Steps. 19 steps
- 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
- 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 2835 tokens
Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.
Quality signals
- +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
- -41 reference files, but SKILL.md never points to them: the model will not open them
- -31 of 1 scripts are never mentioned in SKILL.md
- +2Single-language instructions
- +4Description says when NOT to use the skill
- +3Description length 612: enough signal without eating the budget
- +4Structure: 14 headings
- +3Step-by-step instructions: 19 items
- +3Output format is stated explicitly
- +4Has examples (14 code blocks)
- +1License stated
Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 82.