CC performing-lateral-movement-with-wmiexec
Perform lateral movement across Windows networks using WMI-based remote execution techniques including Impacket wmiexec.py, CrackMapExec, and native WMI commands for stealthy post-exploitation during red team engagements.
Perform lateral movement across Windows networks using WMI-based remote execution techniques including Impacket wmiexec.py, CrackMapExec, and native WMI…
As a process C 51/100 · Has gaps — weak spots: result and completion, when it triggers, failures and branches
How to improve
For the model run — optional
- Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
- A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.
Guard findings · 17
✓ No critical or high findings
Medium and low: 17
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low Risky intent
intent-offensive-securityassets/template.md:1Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)# WMI Lateral Movement Report Template
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low Risky intent
intent-offensive-securityreferences/api-reference.md:1Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)# API Reference — Performing Lateral Movement with WMIExec
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low Risky intent
intent-offensive-securityreferences/api-reference.md:7Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)- **impacket** (external): wmiexec.py for authorized lateral movement testing
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low Risky intent
intent-offensive-securityreferences/api-reference.md:23Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)Uses Impacket wmiexec for authorized penetration testing.
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low Risky intent
intent-offensive-securityreferences/standards.md:1Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)# Standards and References - WMIExec Lateral Movement
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low Risky intent
intent-offensive-securityreferences/standards.md:8Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)| T1021.003 | Remote Services: DCOM | Lateral Movement |
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low Risky intent
intent-offensive-securityreferences/standards.md:9Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)| T1550.002 | Use Alternate Authentication Material: Pass the Hash | Lateral Movement |
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low Risky intent
intent-offensive-securityreferences/standards.md:11Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)| T1570 | Lateral Tool Transfer | Lateral Movement |
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low Risky intent
intent-offensive-securityreferences/workflows.md:1Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)# Workflows - WMIExec Lateral Movement
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low Risky intent
intent-offensive-securityreferences/workflows.md:3Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)## Lateral Movement Chain
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low Risky intent
intent-offensive-securityreferences/workflows.md:6Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)1. Initial Compromise → Credential Harvesting → WMIExec to target
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low Risky intent
intent-offensive-securitySKILL.md:3Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)description: Perform lateral movement across Windows networks using WMI-based remote
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low Risky intent
intent-offensive-securitySKILL.md:5Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)commands for stealthy post-exploitation during red team engagements.
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low Risky intent
intent-offensive-securitySKILL.md:36Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)# Performing Lateral Movement with WMIExec
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low Risky intent
intent-offensive-securitySKILL.md:43Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)WMI (Windows Management Instrumentation) is a legitimate Windows administration framework that red teams abuse for lateral movement because it provides remote command execution without deploying addit
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low Risky intent
intent-offensive-securitySKILL.md:48Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)- When conducting security assessments that involve performing lateral movement with wmiexec
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low Secrets in code
secret-high-entropy-tokenSKILL.md:150High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (detector / deny-list definition)QueryLanguage="WQL"; Query="SELECT * FROM __InstanceModificationEvent WITHIN 60 WHERE TargetInstance ISA 'Win3…tem'"}
detector
Files scanned: 8. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.
Against the Agent Skills spec
- note
frontmatter-keyunknown frontmatter key "domain" - note
frontmatter-keyunknown frontmatter key "subdomain" - note
frontmatter-keyunknown frontmatter key "d3fend_techniques" - note
frontmatter-keyunknown frontmatter key "nist_csf" - note
frontmatter-keyunknown frontmatter key "mitre_attack" - note
edit-residuethe text marks something as outdated (lines 88): check that old rules are not kept next to new ones — the full check reads the text for contradictions
Process rating: all ten parameters 51/100
- 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
- 0Failures and branches. Linear process with no failure handling
- 0Progress reporting. Says nothing while it works
- 20When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
- 30Running it twice. 6 mutating operations with no state check
- 60Tools and files. Uses tools (bash, python) that frontmatter does not declare
- 70Inputs and preconditions. Inputs and preconditions are listed
- 100Steps. 33 steps
- 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
- 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 2020 tokens
- low 10 top-level sections: this looks like several domains in one skill
Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.
Quality signals
- +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
- +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
- +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
- -43 reference files, but SKILL.md never points to them: the model will not open them
- -32 of 2 scripts are never mentioned in SKILL.md
- +2Single-language instructions
- +3Description length 221: enough signal without eating the budget
- +4Structure: 16 headings
- +3Step-by-step instructions: 33 items
- +4Has examples (7 code blocks)
- +1License stated
Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 75.