CB performing-privilege-escalation-assessment
Performs privilege escalation assessments on compromised Linux and Windows systems to identify paths from low-privilege access to root or SYSTEM-level control. The tester enumerates misconfigurations, vulnerable services, kernel exploits, SUID binaries, unquoted service paths, and credential stores to demonstrate the full impact of an initial compromise. Activates for requests involving privilege escalation testing, local exploitation, post-compromise escalation, or OS-level security assessment.
Performs privilege escalation assessments on compromised Linux and Windows systems to identify paths from low-privilege access to root or SYSTEM-level control.
As a process B 76/100 · Nearly there — weak spots: progress reporting
What is at stake
Medium-severity findings: the skill is probably honest, but read what alarmed the scanner.
Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.
The skill contains commands that delete files, rewrite disks or execute code fetched from the network. The agent may run them without asking if it believes the instructions require it.
Replace destructive commands with safe equivalents that ask for confirmation, scope them to one folder, and stop piping curl into a shell: pin a version and a checksum.
How to improve
- Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
- A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.
Guard findings · 11
✓ No critical or high findings
Medium and low: 11
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medium Dangerous commands
cmd-persistencescripts/agent.py:135Persistence mechanism (cron / launchd / scheduled task / autorun registry) (string literal in code, not executed)"/etc/crontab", "/etc/cron.d", "/etc/cron.daily",
code literal -
medium Dangerous commands
cmd-persistencescripts/agent.py:136Persistence mechanism (cron / launchd / scheduled task / autorun registry) (string literal in code, not executed)"/etc/cron.hourly", "/etc/cron.weekly", "/etc/cron.monthly",
code literal -
low Risky intent
intent-offensive-securityreferences/api-reference.md:1Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)# API Reference: Privilege Escalation Assessment
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low Dangerous commands
cmd-persistencereferences/api-reference.md:13Persistence mechanism (cron / launchd / scheduled task / autorun registry) (documentation table row; documentation of a security skill)| `cat /etc/crontab` | System cron jobs |
tablesecurity skill -
low Dangerous commands
cmd-privilegereferences/api-reference.md:31Privilege escalation / world-writable permissions (documentation of a security skill)| SUID/SGID Abuse | T1548.001 | Abusing setuid/setgid binaries |
security skill -
low Risky intent
intent-offensive-securitySKILL.md:3Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use) (quoted — discussed, not commanded)description: 'Performs privilege escalation assessments on compromised Linux and Windows
quoted -
low Risky intent
intent-offensive-securitySKILL.md:7Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)impact of an initial compromise. Activates for requests involving privilege escalation
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low Risky intent
intent-offensive-securitySKILL.md:16Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)- Linux-privesc
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low Risky intent
intent-offensive-securitySKILL.md:17Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)- Windows-privesc
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low Risky intent
intent-offensive-securitySKILL.md:40Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)# Performing Privilege Escalation Assessment
A further 1 matches are quotations in this security skill's documentation and are not counted as findings.
Files scanned: 4. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.
Against the Agent Skills spec
- note
frontmatter-keyunknown frontmatter key "domain" - note
frontmatter-keyunknown frontmatter key "subdomain" - note
frontmatter-keyunknown frontmatter key "d3fend_techniques" - note
frontmatter-keyunknown frontmatter key "nist_csf" - note
frontmatter-keyunknown frontmatter key "mitre_attack"
Process rating: all ten parameters 76/100
- 0Progress reporting. Says nothing while it works
- 50When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
- 60Tools and files. Uses tools (bash) that frontmatter does not declare
- 60Result and completion. Output format stated, no completion criterion
- 70Inputs and preconditions. Inputs and preconditions are listed
- 100Steps. 80 steps
- 100Failures and branches. 3 branches, has a failure section
- 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
- 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 2914 tokens
- 100Running it twice. Mutating operations check current state
Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.
Quality signals
- +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
- -41 reference files, but SKILL.md never points to them: the model will not open them
- -31 of 1 scripts are never mentioned in SKILL.md
- +2Single-language instructions
- +4Description says when NOT to use the skill
- +3Description length 500: enough signal without eating the budget
- +4Structure: 14 headings
- +3Step-by-step instructions: 80 items
- +3Output format is stated explicitly
- +4Has examples (1 code blocks)
- +1License stated
Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 82.