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DC performing-privilege-escalation-on-linux

Guides manual enumeration and automated tooling to escalate from a low-privilege Linux user to root by exploiting misconfigurations, vulnerable services, kernel exploits, and weak permissions, mapped to MITRE ATT&CK. Use during authorized red team engagements or penetration tests once initial low-privilege access on a Linux host is obtained and root-level access is needed.

mukul975/Anthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills Agent Skills author: mukul975 Apache-2.0 6 files · 1 script body ≈ 825 tokens Open the sourcegithub.com↗ analyzed 5 d ago

Guides manual enumeration and automated tooling to escalate from a low-privilege Linux user to root by exploiting misconfigurations, vulnerable services…

As a process C 51/100 · Has gaps — weak spots: result and completion, when it triggers, failures and branches

ProcedureSecurityInfrastructuretype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
Runs in: Claude / Claude Code ChatGPT / Codex Gemini CLI Cursor GitHub Copilot / VS Code Qwen Code Kimi Code CLI Z.ai (GLM) DeepSeek (Deep Code) Mistral Vibe LangChain (deepagents) OpenClaw Goose OpenCode
JSON
Technical rating
D
61/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
54
Quality 40%
71
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
C
51/100
Has gaps
Result and completion w 14
0
Failures and branches w 10
0
Progress reporting w 2
0
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

What is at stake

Medium-severity findings: the skill is probably honest, but read what alarmed the scanner.

Dangerous commands medium severity

Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.

If you install

The skill contains commands that delete files, rewrite disks or execute code fetched from the network. The agent may run them without asking if it believes the instructions require it.

For the author

Replace destructive commands with safe equivalents that ask for confirmation, scope them to one folder, and stop piping curl into a shell: pin a version and a checksum.

How to improve

    For the model run — optional
    • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
    • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

    Guard findings · 22

    ✓ No critical or high findings

    Medium and low: 22
    • medium Dangerous commands cmd-persistence references/api-reference.md:31
      Persistence mechanism (cron / launchd / scheduled task / autorun registry) (documentation of a security skill)
      Checks: /etc/passwd, /etc/shadow, /etc/sudoers, /etc/crontab, /root, cron dirs.
      security skill
    • medium Dangerous commands cmd-persistence references/standards.md:24
      Persistence mechanism (cron / launchd / scheduled task / autorun registry) (documentation of a security skill)
      - Ensure permissions on /etc/crontab are configured (600 root:root)
      security skill
    • medium Dangerous commands cmd-persistence references/workflows.md:44
      Persistence mechanism (cron / launchd / scheduled task / autorun registry) (documentation of a security skill)
      cat /etc/crontab
      security skill
    • medium Dangerous commands cmd-persistence scripts/agent.py:97
      Persistence mechanism (cron / launchd / scheduled task / autorun registry) (string literal in code, not executed)
      interesting_paths = ["/etc/passwd", "/etc/shadow", "/etc/sudoers", "/etc/crontab",
      code literal
    • medium Dangerous commands cmd-persistence scripts/agent.py:98
      Persistence mechanism (cron / launchd / scheduled task / autorun registry) (string literal in code, not executed)
      "/etc/cron.d", "/etc/systemd/system", "/root"]
      code literal
    • medium Dangerous commands cmd-persistence scripts/agent.py:121
      Persistence mechanism (cron / launchd / scheduled task / autorun registry) (string literal in code, not executed)
      cron_paths = ["/etc/crontab", "/etc/cron.d", "/var/spool/cron/crontabs"]
      code literal
    • low Risky intent intent-offensive-security references/api-reference.md:1
      Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)
      # API Reference — Performing Privilege Escalation on Linux
    • low Risky intent intent-offensive-security references/api-reference.md:33
      Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)
      ### `check_cron_jobs()` — Cron job privilege escalation vectors
    • low Risky intent intent-offensive-security references/standards.md:3
      Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)
      ## MITRE ATT&CK - Privilege Escalation (TA0004)
    • low Dangerous commands cmd-privilege references/standards.md:6
      Privilege escalation / world-writable permissions (documentation of a security skill)
      | T1548.001 | Setuid and Setgid | Exploit SUID/SGID binaries |
      security skill
    • low Risky intent intent-offensive-security references/standards.md:8
      Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)
      | T1068 | Exploitation for Privilege Escalation | Kernel/service exploits |
    • low Risky intent intent-offensive-security references/workflows.md:1
      Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)
      # Linux Privilege Escalation Workflows
    • low Dangerous commands cmd-cron-mention references/workflows.md:46
      Mentions editing / listing crontab (documentation of a security skill)
      crontab -l
      security skill
    • low Dangerous commands cmd-pipe-to-shell-known-host references/workflows.md:65
      Pipe-to-shell installer from a well-known host (still executes remote code) (documentation of a security skill)
      curl -L https://github.com/peass-ng/PEASS-ng/releases/latest/download/linpeas.sh | sh
      security skill
    • low Dangerous commands cmd-privilege references/workflows.md:106
      Privilege escalation / world-writable permissions (documentation of a security skill)
      # sudo python3
      security skill
    • low Dangerous commands cmd-privilege references/workflows.md:107
      Privilege escalation / world-writable permissions (documentation of a security skill)
      sudo python3 -c 'import pty; pty.spawn("/bin/bash")'
      security skill
    • low Risky intent intent-offensive-security SKILL.md:5
      Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)
      and weak permissions, mapped to MITRE ATT&CK. Use during authorized red team engagements
    • low Risky intent intent-offensive-security SKILL.md:38
      Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)
      # Performing Privilege Escalation on Linux
    • low Risky intent intent-offensive-security SKILL.md:45
      Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)
      Linux privilege escalation involves elevating from a low-privilege user account to root access on a compromised system. Red teams exploit misconfigurations, vulnerable services, kernel exploits, and w
    • low Risky intent intent-offensive-security SKILL.md:50
      Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)
      - When conducting security assessments that involve performing privilege escalation on linux
    • low Risky intent intent-offensive-security SKILL.md:57
      Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)
      - Familiarity with red teaming concepts and tools
    • low Dangerous commands cmd-privilege SKILL.md:64
      Privilege escalation / world-writable permissions (documentation of a security skill)
      - **T1548.001** - Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism: Setuid and Setgid
      security skill

    Files scanned: 6. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

    Against the Agent Skills spec

    • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "domain"
    • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "subdomain"
    • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "d3fend_techniques"
    • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "nist_csf"
    • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "mitre_attack"

    Process rating: all ten parameters 51/100

    • 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
    • 0Failures and branches. Linear process with no failure handling
    • 0Progress reporting. Says nothing while it works
    • 20When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
    • 30Running it twice. 1 mutating operations with no state check
    • 60Tools and files. Uses tools (python) that frontmatter does not declare
    • 70Inputs and preconditions. Inputs and preconditions are listed
    • 100Steps. 39 steps
    • 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
    • 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 825 tokens

    Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

    Quality signals

    • +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
    • +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
    • +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
    • +4No input/output examples
    • -43 reference files, but SKILL.md never points to them: the model will not open them
    • -31 of 1 scripts are never mentioned in SKILL.md
    • +2Single-language instructions
    • +3Description length 375: enough signal without eating the budget
    • +4Structure: 14 headings
    • +3Step-by-step instructions: 39 items
    • +1License stated

    Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 71.