CB performing-purple-team-atomic-testing
Executes Atomic Red Team tests mapped to MITRE ATT&CK via Invoke-AtomicRedTeam PowerShell, generates ATT&CK Navigator coverage heatmaps, correlates results against Sigma rules, and runs detection validation loops to measure blue team visibility. Use for purple team exercises, atomic test execution, ATT&CK coverage assessment, or detection engineering validation.
Executes Atomic Red Team tests mapped to MITRE ATT&CK via Invoke-AtomicRedTeam PowerShell, generates ATT&CK Navigator coverage heatmaps, correlates results…
As a process B 67/100 · Nearly there — weak spots: failures and branches, execution cost, running it twice
How to improve
- The SKILL.md body is over 5,000 tokens: move reference detail into references/ and load it when needed.
- Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
- A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.
Guard findings · 10
✓ No critical or high findings
Medium and low: 10
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low Risky intent
intent-offensive-securityreferences/api-reference.md:5Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)Parses Atomic Red Team YAML test definitions, correlates execution logs with SIEM detection results, generates MITRE ATT&CK Navigator heatmap layers, computes per-tactic coverage gap analysis, suggest
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low Risky intent
intent-offensive-securityreferences/api-reference.md:11Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)| pyyaml | >=6.0 | Parsing Atomic Red Team YAML test definitions |
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low Risky intent
intent-offensive-securityreferences/api-reference.md:55Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)| `--atomics-path` | No | Path to Atomic Red Team atomics directory (default: `C:\AtomicRedTeam\atomics`) |
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low Risky intent
intent-offensive-securityreferences/api-reference.md:68Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)Parses all Atomic Red Team YAML files (`T*/T*.yaml`) from the atomics directory. Returns a dictionary keyed by technique ID containing technique name, test count, supported platforms, executor types,
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low Risky intent
intent-offensive-securityreferences/api-reference.md:126Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)| Privilege Escalation | TA0004 | T1548.002, T1134.001, T1068, T1055.001, and 2 more |
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low Risky intent
intent-offensive-securitySKILL.md:3Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use) (quoted — discussed, not commanded)description: 'Executes Atomic Red Team tests mapped to MITRE ATT&CK via Invoke-AtomicRedTeam
quoted -
low Risky intent
intent-offensive-securitySKILL.md:50Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)- Running purple team exercises using Atomic Red Team test library
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low Risky intent
intent-offensive-securitySKILL.md:57Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)**Do not use** for full-scope red team engagements requiring custom implants or live adversary simulation beyond atomic tests; use Caldera, SCYTHE, or Cobalt Strike for advanced adversary emulation.
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low Risky intent
intent-offensive-securitySKILL.md:59Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)**DISCLAIMER**: Atomic Red Team tests execute real attack techniques. Run only on systems you own or have explicit written authorization to test. Many tests modify system state, create artifacts, or t
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low Risky intent
intent-offensive-securitySKILL.md:65Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)- Atomic Red Team atomics repository cloned locally
Files scanned: 4. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.
Against the Agent Skills spec
- warning
body-longSKILL.md body ≈ 9604 tokens (recommended < 5000); move details to references/ - note
frontmatter-keyunknown frontmatter key "domain" - note
frontmatter-keyunknown frontmatter key "subdomain" - note
frontmatter-keyunknown frontmatter key "nist_ai_rmf" - note
frontmatter-keyunknown frontmatter key "atlas_techniques" - note
frontmatter-keyunknown frontmatter key "d3fend_techniques" - note
frontmatter-keyunknown frontmatter key "nist_csf" - note
frontmatter-keyunknown frontmatter key "mitre_attack"
Process rating: all ten parameters 67/100
- 0Failures and branches. Linear process with no failure handling
- 30Running it twice. 8 mutating operations with no state check
- 40Execution cost. Instruction body is 9604 tokens: crowds the task out of the window
- 50When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
- 60Tools and files. Uses tools (bash, python) that frontmatter does not declare
- 70Inputs and preconditions. Inputs and preconditions are listed
- 100Steps. 47 steps
- 100Result and completion. Output format and completion criterion are stated
- 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
- 100Progress reporting. Reports progress
Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.
Quality signals
- +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
- -41 reference files, but SKILL.md never points to them: the model will not open them
- -31 of 1 scripts are never mentioned in SKILL.md
- +2Single-language instructions
- +4Description says when NOT to use the skill
- +3Description length 364: enough signal without eating the budget
- +4Structure: 17 headings
- +3Step-by-step instructions: 47 items
- +3Output format is stated explicitly
- +4Has examples (9 code blocks)
- +1License stated
Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 72.