SKILLEMALL.ai

CB performing-soc-tabletop-exercise

Performs tabletop exercises for SOC teams simulating security incidents through discussion-based scenarios to test incident response procedures, communication workflows, and decision-making under pressure without impacting production systems. Use when organizations need to validate IR playbooks, train analysts, or meet compliance requirements for incident response testing.

mukul975/Anthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills Agent Skills author: mukul975 Apache-2.0 4 files · 1 script body ≈ 4 012 tokens Open the sourcegithub.com↗ analyzed 5 d ago

Performs tabletop exercises for SOC teams simulating security incidents through discussion-based scenarios to test incident response procedures, communication…

As a process B 69/100 · Nearly there — weak spots: failures and branches, running it twice, progress reporting

ProcedureAI and agentstype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
JSON
Technical rating
C
87/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
91
Quality 40%
82
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
B
69/100
Nearly there
Failures and branches w 10
0
Progress reporting w 2
0
Running it twice w 4
30
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

How to improve

    For the model run — optional
    • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
    • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

    Guard findings · 9

    ✓ No critical or high findings

    Medium and low: 9
    • low Risky intent intent-offensive-security references/api-reference.md:18
      Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use) (quoted — discussed, not commanded)
      - **Parameters**: `scenario_type` (str) - one of `ransomware`, `data_breach`, `supply_chain`; `participants` (list[dict]) - role/count pairs
      quoted
    • low Risky intent intent-offensive-security references/api-reference.md:40
      Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use) (documentation table row)
      | `ransomware` | 6 injects | Detection, containment, ransom decision, recovery |
      table
    • low Risky intent intent-offensive-security references/api-reference.md:42
      Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)
      | `supply_chain` | 4 injects | Vendor compromise, lateral movement, credential reset |
    • low Risky intent intent-offensive-security references/api-reference.md:61
      Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use) (detector / deny-list definition)
      "strengths": ["Ransomware indicators correctly identified"]
      detector
    • low Risky intent intent-offensive-security SKILL.md:64
      Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use) (quoted — discussed, not commanded)
      title: "Operation Dark Harvest — Ransomware Attack Scenario"
      quoted
    • low Risky intent intent-offensive-security SKILL.md:71
      Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use) (detector / deny-list definition)
      1: "Test SOC team's ability to detect and triage ransomware indicators"
      detector
    • low Risky intent intent-offensive-security SKILL.md:142
      Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use) (quoted — discussed, not commanded)
      - "This is now a confirmed ransomware incident. What is your incident classification?"
      quoted
    • low Risky intent intent-offensive-security SKILL.md:173
      Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)
      - Attacker had access for 5 days before deploying ransomware
    • low Risky intent intent-offensive-security SKILL.md:176
      Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)
      - The ransomware variant is identified as LockBit 3.0

    Files scanned: 4. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

    Against the Agent Skills spec

    • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "domain"
    • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "subdomain"
    • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "mitre_attack"
    • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "nist_csf"

    Process rating: all ten parameters 69/100

    • 0Failures and branches. Linear process with no failure handling
    • 0Progress reporting. Says nothing while it works
    • 30Running it twice. 2 mutating operations with no state check
    • 50When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
    • 60Result and completion. Output format stated, no completion criterion
    • 70Inputs and preconditions. Inputs and preconditions are listed
    • 70Execution cost. Instruction body is 4012 tokens
    • 100Tools and files. No external tools needed
    • 100Steps. 21 steps
    • 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place

    Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

    Quality signals

    • +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
    • -41 reference files, but SKILL.md never points to them: the model will not open them
    • -31 of 1 scripts are never mentioned in SKILL.md
    • +2Single-language instructions
    • +4Description says when NOT to use the skill
    • +3Description length 375: enough signal without eating the budget
    • +4Structure: 14 headings
    • +3Step-by-step instructions: 21 items
    • +3Output format is stated explicitly
    • +4Has examples (7 code blocks)
    • +1License stated

    Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 82.