SKILLEMALL.ai

CC performing-thick-client-application-penetration-test

Conduct a thick client application penetration test to identify insecure local storage, hardcoded credentials, DLL hijacking, memory manipulation, and insecure API communication in desktop applications using dnSpy, Procmon, and Burp Suite.

mukul975/Anthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills Agent Skills author: mukul975 Apache-2.0 8 files · 2 scripts body ≈ 1 905 tokens Open the sourcegithub.com↗ analyzed 5 d ago

Conduct a thick client application penetration test to identify insecure local storage, hardcoded credentials, DLL hijacking, memory manipulation, and…

As a process C 61/100 · Has gaps — weak spots: result and completion, when it triggers, failures and branches

ProcedureSoftware developmentInfrastructureSecuritytype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
JSON
Technical rating
C
84/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
90
Quality 40%
75
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
C
61/100
Has gaps
Result and completion w 14
0
Failures and branches w 10
0
Progress reporting w 2
0
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

How to improve

    For the model run — optional
    • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
    • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

    Guard findings · 10

    ✓ No critical or high findings

    Medium and low: 10
    • low Risky intent intent-offensive-security assets/template.md:1
      Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)
      # Thick Client Penetration Test — Report Template
    • low Risky intent intent-offensive-security references/api-reference.md:1
      Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)
      # API Reference: Thick Client Penetration Testing
    • low Risky intent intent-offensive-security references/standards.md:1
      Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)
      # Standards — Thick Client Application Penetration Testing
    • low Risky intent intent-offensive-security references/standards.md:5
      Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)
      - PTES Application Security: http://www.pentest-standard.org/
    • low Risky intent intent-offensive-security references/workflows.md:1
      Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)
      # Workflows — Thick Client Penetration Testing
    • low Risky intent intent-offensive-security SKILL.md:3
      Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)
      description: Conduct a thick client application penetration test to identify insecure
    • low Risky intent intent-offensive-security SKILL.md:40
      Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)
      # Performing Thick Client Application Penetration Test
    • low Risky intent intent-offensive-security SKILL.md:44
      Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)
      Thick client (fat client) penetration testing assesses the security of desktop applications that run locally on user machines and communicate with backend servers. Unlike web applications, thick clien
    • low Risky intent intent-offensive-security SKILL.md:49
      Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)
      - When conducting security assessments that involve performing thick client application penetration test
    • low Risky intent intent-offensive-security SKILL.md:207
      Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)
      # Modify memory values (license bypass, privilege escalation)

    Files scanned: 8. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

    Against the Agent Skills spec

    • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "domain"
    • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "subdomain"
    • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "nist_ai_rmf"
    • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "atlas_techniques"
    • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "nist_csf"
    • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "mitre_attack"
    • note edit-residue the text marks something as outdated (lines 6): check that old rules are not kept next to new ones — the full check reads the text for contradictions

    Process rating: all ten parameters 61/100

    • 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
    • 0Failures and branches. Linear process with no failure handling
    • 0Progress reporting. Says nothing while it works
    • 20When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
    • 70Inputs and preconditions. Inputs and preconditions are listed
    • 100Tools and files. No external tools needed
    • 100Steps. 13 steps
    • 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
    • 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 1905 tokens
    • 100Running it twice. No mutating operations

    Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

    Quality signals

    • +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
    • +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
    • +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
    • -43 reference files, but SKILL.md never points to them: the model will not open them
    • -32 of 2 scripts are never mentioned in SKILL.md
    • +2Single-language instructions
    • +3Description length 239: enough signal without eating the budget
    • +4Structure: 18 headings
    • +3Step-by-step instructions: 13 items
    • +4Has examples (9 code blocks)
    • +1License stated

    Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 75.