CC performing-windows-artifact-analysis-with-eric-zimmerman-tools
Performs comprehensive Windows forensic artifact analysis using Eric Zimmerman's open-source EZ Tools suite (KAPE, MFTECmd, PECmd, LECmd, JLECmd, Timeline Explorer) to parse registry hives, prefetch files, event logs, and file system metadata. Use during DFIR investigations that need a timeline of program execution, file access, and persistence built from Windows artifacts.
Performs comprehensive Windows forensic artifact analysis using Eric Zimmerman's open-source EZ Tools suite (KAPE, MFTECmd, PECmd, LECmd, JLECmd, Timeline…
As a process C 62/100 · Has gaps — weak spots: when it triggers, failures and branches, running it twice
How to improve
- Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
- A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.
Guard findings · 5
✓ No critical or high findings
Medium and low: 5
-
low Risky intent
intent-offensive-securityassets/template.md:47Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)### Lateral Movement Indicators
-
low Risky intent
intent-offensive-securityreferences/standards.md:53Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)- T1021 - Remote Services: Lateral movement via event log analysis
-
low Risky intent
intent-offensive-securityreferences/workflows.md:59Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)## Workflow 4: Lateral Movement Investigation
-
low Risky intent
intent-offensive-securityreferences/workflows.md:77Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)Step 6: Map lateral movement path across systems
-
low Risky intent
intent-offensive-securitySKILL.md:275Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)### Lateral Movement Detection
Files scanned: 8. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.
Against the Agent Skills spec
- note
frontmatter-keyunknown frontmatter key "domain" - note
frontmatter-keyunknown frontmatter key "subdomain" - note
frontmatter-keyunknown frontmatter key "nist_csf" - note
frontmatter-keyunknown frontmatter key "mitre_attack"
Process rating: all ten parameters 62/100
- 0Failures and branches. Linear process with no failure handling
- 20When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
- 30Running it twice. 4 mutating operations with no state check
- 60Tools and files. Uses tools (bash, web) that frontmatter does not declare
- 60Result and completion. Output format stated, no completion criterion
- 70Inputs and preconditions. Inputs and preconditions are listed
- 100Steps. 42 steps
- 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
- 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 2804 tokens
- 100Progress reporting. Reports progress
Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.
Quality signals
- +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
- +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
- -4Absolute local paths (C:\Users, /home/…): not portable
- -43 reference files, but SKILL.md never points to them: the model will not open them
- -32 of 2 scripts are never mentioned in SKILL.md
- +2Single-language instructions
- +3Description length 376: enough signal without eating the budget
- +4Structure: 25 headings
- +3Step-by-step instructions: 42 items
- +3Output format is stated explicitly
- +4Has examples (12 code blocks)
- +1License stated
Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 74.