CC red-teaming-llms-with-garak
Runs NVIDIA garak probe suites (jailbreak, prompt injection, data leakage, toxicity, and more) against an LLM endpoint - Hugging Face models, OpenAI-compatible APIs, or Bedrock - then interprets the resulting hit-rate report for triage. Use when baselining LLM security before/after deployment, validating that a guardrail or fine-tune reduces jailbreak/injection success rates, or producing evidence for an AI risk assessment.
Runs NVIDIA garak probe suites (jailbreak, prompt injection, data leakage, toxicity, and more) against an LLM endpoint - Hugging Face models…
As a process C 51/100 · Has gaps — weak spots: result and completion, when it triggers, failures and branches
How to improve
- Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
- A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.
Guard findings · 2
✓ No critical or high findings
Medium and low: 2
-
low Risky intent
intent-offensive-securitySKILL.md:81Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)| AML.T0054 | Privilege Escalation / Defense Evasion | LLM Jailbreak | garak's `dan` and related probes attempt to bypass safety guardrails so the model produces restricted content. |
A further 1 matches are quotations in this security skill's documentation and are not counted as findings.
Files scanned: 5. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.
Against the Agent Skills spec
- note
frontmatter-keyunknown frontmatter key "domain" - note
frontmatter-keyunknown frontmatter key "subdomain" - note
frontmatter-keyunknown frontmatter key "nist_ai_rmf" - note
frontmatter-keyunknown frontmatter key "atlas_techniques"
Process rating: all ten parameters 51/100
- 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
- 0Failures and branches. Linear process with no failure handling
- 20When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
- 30Running it twice. 4 mutating operations with no state check
- 60Tools and files. Uses tools (bash, python) that frontmatter does not declare
- 70Inputs and preconditions. Inputs and preconditions are listed
- 85Steps. 50 steps, 1 vague phrases
- 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
- 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 2675 tokens
- 100Progress reporting. Reports progress
Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.
Quality signals
- +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
- +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
- +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
- -42 reference files, but SKILL.md never points to them: the model will not open them
- -31 of 1 scripts are never mentioned in SKILL.md
- +2Single-language instructions
- +3Description length 427: enough signal without eating the budget
- +4Structure: 17 headings
- +3Step-by-step instructions: 50 items
- +4Has examples (12 code blocks)
- +1License stated
Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 75.