CC relaying-ntlm-for-adcs-esc8
Uses Impacket's ntlmrelayx.py with a coercion tool (PetitPotam, Coercer, printerbug) to relay NTLM authentication from a coerced domain controller into the AD CS HTTP web-enrollment endpoint (ESC8), obtaining a DC certificate usable via Certipy for PKINIT/DCSync. Use during internal AD penetration tests or purple-team exercises when AD CS Web Enrollment lacks Extended Protection for Authentication.
Uses Impacket's ntlmrelayx.py with a coercion tool (PetitPotam, Coercer, printerbug) to relay NTLM authentication from a coerced domain controller into the AD…
As a process C 56/100 · Has gaps — weak spots: result and completion, when it triggers, failures and branches
How to improve
- Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
- A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.
Guard findings · 4
✓ No critical or high findings
Medium and low: 4
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low Risky intent
intent-offensive-securityreferences/standards.md:16Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)| T1003.006 | OS Credential Dumping: DCSync | Credential Access | The recovered DC identity enables DCSync. |
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low Risky intent
intent-offensive-securitySKILL.md:29Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)> **Legal Notice:** This skill is for authorized penetration testing, red-team engagements, and educational purposes only. Coercing authentication and relaying credentials against systems you do not o
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low Risky intent
intent-offensive-securitySKILL.md:41Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)- During an internal AD penetration test where AD CS with the HTTP Web Enrollment role is present and EPA is not enforced.
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low Risky intent
intent-offensive-securitySKILL.md:81Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)| T1003.006 | OS Credential Dumping: DCSync | Credential Access | The recovered DC identity enables DCSync for full domain compromise. |
Files scanned: 5. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.
Against the Agent Skills spec
- note
frontmatter-keyunknown frontmatter key "domain" - note
frontmatter-keyunknown frontmatter key "subdomain" - note
frontmatter-keyunknown frontmatter key "nist_csf" - note
frontmatter-keyunknown frontmatter key "mitre_attack"
Process rating: all ten parameters 56/100
- 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
- 0Failures and branches. Linear process with no failure handling
- 0Progress reporting. Says nothing while it works
- 20When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
- 30Running it twice. 1 mutating operations with no state check
- 70Inputs and preconditions. Inputs and preconditions are listed
- 85Steps. 25 steps, 1 vague phrases
- 100Tools and files. No external tools needed
- 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
- 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 2174 tokens
Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.
Quality signals
- +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
- +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
- +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
- -42 reference files, but SKILL.md never points to them: the model will not open them
- -31 of 1 scripts are never mentioned in SKILL.md
- +2Single-language instructions
- +3Description length 401: enough signal without eating the budget
- +4Structure: 16 headings
- +3Step-by-step instructions: 25 items
- +4Has examples (10 code blocks)
- +1License stated
Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 75.