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CB securing-kubernetes-on-cloud

Hardens managed Kubernetes clusters on EKS, AKS, and GKE by implementing Pod Security Standards, network policies, workload identity (IRSA for EKS, Workload Identity for GKE, Managed Identities for AKS), RBAC scoping, image admission controls, and runtime security monitoring. Use when deploying a new managed Kubernetes cluster with security requirements or hardening an existing EKS, AKS, or GKE cluster after an audit or pentest finding.

mukul975/Anthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills Agent Skills author: mukul975 Apache-2.0 4 files · 1 script body ≈ 3 058 tokens Open the sourcegithub.com↗ analyzed 5 d ago

Hardens managed Kubernetes clusters on EKS, AKS, and GKE by implementing Pod Security Standards, network policies, workload identity (IRSA for EKS, Workload…

As a process B 70/100 · Nearly there — weak spots: failures and branches, running it twice, progress reporting

ProcedureKubernetesAzureGoogle CloudSecurityAI and agentstype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
Runs in: Claude / Claude Code ChatGPT / Codex Gemini CLI Cursor GitHub Copilot / VS Code Qwen Code Kimi Code CLI Z.ai (GLM) DeepSeek (Deep Code) Mistral Vibe LangChain (deepagents) OpenClaw Goose OpenCode
JSON
Technical rating
C
86/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
89
Quality 40%
82
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
B
70/100
Nearly there
Failures and branches w 10
0
Progress reporting w 2
0
Running it twice w 4
30
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

What is at stake

Medium-severity findings: the skill is probably honest, but read what alarmed the scanner.

Dangerous commands medium severity

Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.

If you install

The skill contains commands that delete files, rewrite disks or execute code fetched from the network. The agent may run them without asking if it believes the instructions require it.

For the author

Replace destructive commands with safe equivalents that ask for confirmation, scope them to one folder, and stop piping curl into a shell: pin a version and a checksum.

How to improve

    For the model run — optional
    • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
    • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

    Guard findings · 7

    ✓ No critical or high findings

    Medium and low: 7
    • medium Dangerous commands cmd-cryptominer SKILL.md:342
      Installs or runs a cryptocurrency miner on the user's machine (documentation of a security skill)
      **Context**: GuardDuty Extended Threat Detection generates an AttackSequence:EKS/CompromisedCluster finding. A developer pulled a public Docker image containing an embedded XMRig cryptominer that exec
      security skill
    • low Dangerous commands cmd-privilege references/api-reference.md:54
      Privilege escalation / world-writable permissions (documentation of a security skill)
      | `allow_privilege_escalation` | Allow setuid/capabilities |
      security skill
    • low Risky intent intent-offensive-security SKILL.md:8
      Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)
      an audit or pentest finding.
    • low Risky intent intent-offensive-security SKILL.md:41
      Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)
      - When hardening existing EKS, AKS, or GKE clusters after a security audit or pentest finding
    • low Risky intent intent-offensive-security SKILL.md:380
      Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)
      Risk: Unrestricted lateral movement between all pods

    A further 2 matches are quotations in this security skill's documentation and are not counted as findings.

    Files scanned: 4. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

    Against the Agent Skills spec

    • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "domain"
    • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "subdomain"
    • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "nist_csf"
    • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "mitre_attack"

    Process rating: all ten parameters 70/100

    • 0Failures and branches. Linear process with no failure handling
    • 0Progress reporting. Says nothing while it works
    • 30Running it twice. 12 mutating operations with no state check
    • 50When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
    • 60Result and completion. Output format stated, no completion criterion
    • 70Inputs and preconditions. Inputs and preconditions are listed
    • 100Tools and files. No external tools needed
    • 100Steps. 20 steps
    • 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
    • 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 3058 tokens

    Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

    Quality signals

    • +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
    • -41 reference files, but SKILL.md never points to them: the model will not open them
    • -31 of 1 scripts are never mentioned in SKILL.md
    • +2Single-language instructions
    • +4Description says when NOT to use the skill
    • +3Description length 440: enough signal without eating the budget
    • +4Structure: 15 headings
    • +3Step-by-step instructions: 20 items
    • +3Output format is stated explicitly
    • +4Has examples (8 code blocks)
    • +1License stated

    Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 82.