BB testing-api-for-broken-object-level-authorization
Tests REST and GraphQL APIs for Broken Object Level Authorization (BOLA/IDOR, OWASP API1:2023) by intercepting API calls, identifying object ID parameters (numeric IDs, UUIDs, slugs), and systematically substituting IDs belonging to other users to check whether the server enforces per-object authorization. Use when asked to test BOLA or IDOR in an API, verify object-level authorization, or assess an API for access control bypass.
Tests REST and GraphQL APIs for Broken Object Level Authorization (BOLA/IDOR, OWASP API1:2023) by intercepting API calls, identifying object ID parameters…
As a process B 69/100 · Nearly there — weak spots: running it twice, progress reporting
How to improve
- Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
- A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.
Guard findings · 3
✓ No critical or high findings
Medium and low: 3
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low Risky intent
intent-offensive-securitySKILL.md:133Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)### Step 3: BOLA Testing - Horizontal Privilege Escalation
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low Risky intent
intent-offensive-securitySKILL.md:318Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)| **Horizontal Privilege Escalation** | Accessing resources belonging to another user at the same privilege level by manipulating object identifiers |
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low Risky intent
intent-offensive-securitySKILL.md:319Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)| **Vertical Privilege Escalation** | Accessing resources or functions restricted to a higher privilege level (e.g., regular user accessing admin endpoints) |
Files scanned: 4. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.
Against the Agent Skills spec
- note
frontmatter-keyunknown frontmatter key "domain" - note
frontmatter-keyunknown frontmatter key "subdomain" - note
frontmatter-keyunknown frontmatter key "nist_csf" - note
frontmatter-keyunknown frontmatter key "mitre_attack"
Process rating: all ten parameters 69/100
- 0Progress reporting. Says nothing while it works
- 30Running it twice. 2 mutating operations with no state check
- 50When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
- 60Tools and files. Uses tools (python) that frontmatter does not declare
- 60Result and completion. Output format stated, no completion criterion
- 60Failures and branches. 2 branches
- 70Inputs and preconditions. Inputs and preconditions are listed
- 100Steps. 48 steps
- 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
- 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 3834 tokens
Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.
Quality signals
- +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
- -41 reference files, but SKILL.md never points to them: the model will not open them
- -31 of 1 scripts are never mentioned in SKILL.md
- +2Single-language instructions
- +4Description says when NOT to use the skill
- +3Description length 433: enough signal without eating the budget
- +4Structure: 15 headings
- +3Step-by-step instructions: 48 items
- +3Output format is stated explicitly
- +4Has examples (6 code blocks)
- +1License stated
Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 82.