SKILLEMALL.ai
GitHub ↗ RU Sign in

CC testing-api-security-with-owasp-top-10

Systematically assesses REST, GraphQL, and gRPC API endpoints against the OWASP API Security Top 10 (2023) using Burp Suite and Postman for automated and manual testing. Use during authorized API penetration tests, before deploying new endpoints to production, or when validating API gateway controls and rate limiting.

mukul975/Anthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills Agent Skills author: mukul975 Apache-2.0 4 files · 1 script body ≈ 3 076 tokens Open the sourcegithub.com↗ analyzed 5 d ago

Systematically assesses REST, GraphQL, and gRPC API endpoints against the OWASP API Security Top 10 (2023) using Burp Suite and Postman for automated and…

As a process C 60/100 · Has gaps — weak spots: when it triggers, failures and branches, running it twice

IntegrationSecuritytype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
Runs in: Claude / Claude Code ChatGPT / Codex Gemini CLI Cursor GitHub Copilot / VS Code Qwen Code Kimi Code CLI Z.ai (GLM) DeepSeek (Deep Code) Mistral Vibe LangChain (deepagents) OpenClaw Goose OpenCode
JSON
Technical rating
C
86/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
93
Quality 40%
76
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
C
60/100
Has gaps
Failures and branches w 10
0
Progress reporting w 2
0
When it triggers w 12
20
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

How to improve

    For the model run — optional
    • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
    • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

    Guard findings · 7

    ✓ No critical or high findings

    Medium and low: 7
    • low Risky intent intent-offensive-security SKILL.md:36
      Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)
      - During authorized API penetration testing engagements
    • low Exfiltration net-credential-use SKILL.md:96
      Credential used in a network call (verify the destination is the intended service) (documentation of a security skill)
      curl -s -H "Authorization: $TOKEN_A" \
      security skill
    • low Exfiltration net-credential-use SKILL.md:100
      Credential used in a network call (verify the destination is the intended service) (documentation of a security skill)
      curl -s -H "Authorization: $TOKEN_A" \
      security skill
    • low Exfiltration net-credential-use SKILL.md:152
      Credential used in a network call (verify the destination is the intended service) (documentation of a security skill)
      curl -s -H "Authorization: $TOKEN_A" \
      security skill
    • low Exfiltration net-credential-use SKILL.md:171
      Credential used in a network call (verify the destination is the intended service) (documentation of a security skill)
      curl -s -H "Authorization: $TOKEN_A" \
      security skill
    • low Exfiltration net-credential-use SKILL.md:173
      Credential used in a network call (verify the destination is the intended service) (documentation of a security skill)
      curl -s -H "Authorization: $TOKEN_A" \
      security skill
    • low Risky intent intent-offensive-security SKILL.md:217
      Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)
      Check for privilege escalation through administrative endpoints.

    Files scanned: 4. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

    Against the Agent Skills spec

    • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "domain"
    • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "subdomain"
    • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "nist_csf"
    • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "mitre_attack"
    • note edit-residue the text marks something as outdated (lines 248, 270, 292, 293): check that old rules are not kept next to new ones — the full check reads the text for contradictions

    Process rating: all ten parameters 60/100

    • 0Failures and branches. Linear process with no failure handling
    • 0Progress reporting. Says nothing while it works
    • 20When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
    • 30Running it twice. 1 mutating operations with no state check
    • 60Tools and files. Uses tools (web) that frontmatter does not declare
    • 60Result and completion. Output format stated, no completion criterion
    • 70Inputs and preconditions. Inputs and preconditions are listed
    • 100Steps. 12 steps
    • 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
    • 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 3076 tokens

    Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

    Quality signals

    • +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
    • +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
    • -2localhost URLs: will not work for another user
    • -41 reference files, but SKILL.md never points to them: the model will not open them
    • -31 of 1 scripts are never mentioned in SKILL.md
    • +2Single-language instructions
    • +3Description length 319: enough signal without eating the budget
    • +4Structure: 19 headings
    • +3Step-by-step instructions: 12 items
    • +3Output format is stated explicitly
    • +4Has examples (8 code blocks)
    • +1License stated

    Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 76.