CC testing-for-broken-access-control
Systematically tests web applications and APIs for broken access control (OWASP A01:2021), including privilege escalation, missing function-level checks, insecure direct object references, and multi-tenant data leakage, using Burp Suite with the Authorize extension. Use during authorized penetration tests or RBAC/multi-tenant authorization audits.
Systematically tests web applications and APIs for broken access control (OWASP A01:2021), including privilege escalation, missing function-level checks…
As a process C 60/100 · Has gaps — weak spots: when it triggers, failures and branches, running it twice
How to improve
- Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
- A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.
Guard findings · 10
✓ No critical or high findings
Medium and low: 10
-
low Risky intent
intent-offensive-securityreferences/api-reference.md:19Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)### Vertical Privilege Escalation
-
low Risky intent
intent-offensive-securityreferences/api-reference.md:27Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)### Horizontal Privilege Escalation (IDOR)
-
low Risky intent
intent-offensive-securitySKILL.md:4Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)(OWASP A01:2021), including privilege escalation, missing function-level checks, insecure
-
low Risky intent
intent-offensive-securitySKILL.md:41Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)- During security audits where privilege escalation and unauthorized access are primary concerns
-
low Risky intent
intent-offensive-securitySKILL.md:45Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)- **Authorization**: Written penetration testing agreement for the target
-
low Risky intent
intent-offensive-securitySKILL.md:116Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)### Step 3: Test Vertical Privilege Escalation
-
low Risky intent
intent-offensive-securitySKILL.md:172Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)### Step 4: Test Horizontal Privilege Escalation
-
low Exfiltration
net-credential-useSKILL.md:269Credential used in a network call (verify the destination is the intended service) (documentation of a security skill)curl -s -H "Authorization: $TENANT_A_TOKEN" \
security skill -
low Exfiltration
net-credential-useSKILL.md:272Credential used in a network call (verify the destination is the intended service) (documentation of a security skill)curl -s -H "Authorization: $TENANT_A_TOKEN" \
security skill -
low Exfiltration
net-credential-useSKILL.md:276Credential used in a network call (verify the destination is the intended service) (documentation of a security skill)curl -s -H "Authorization: $TENANT_A_TOKEN" \
security skill
Files scanned: 4. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.
Against the Agent Skills spec
- note
frontmatter-keyunknown frontmatter key "domain" - note
frontmatter-keyunknown frontmatter key "subdomain" - note
frontmatter-keyunknown frontmatter key "nist_csf" - note
frontmatter-keyunknown frontmatter key "mitre_attack"
Process rating: all ten parameters 60/100
- 0Failures and branches. Linear process with no failure handling
- 0Progress reporting. Says nothing while it works
- 20When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
- 30Running it twice. 3 mutating operations with no state check
- 60Tools and files. Uses tools (web) that frontmatter does not declare
- 60Result and completion. Output format stated, no completion criterion
- 70Inputs and preconditions. Inputs and preconditions are listed
- 100Steps. 11 steps
- 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
- 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 3145 tokens
Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.
Quality signals
- +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
- +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
- -41 reference files, but SKILL.md never points to them: the model will not open them
- -31 of 1 scripts are never mentioned in SKILL.md
- +2Single-language instructions
- +3Description length 349: enough signal without eating the budget
- +4Structure: 18 headings
- +3Step-by-step instructions: 11 items
- +3Output format is stated explicitly
- +4Has examples (7 code blocks)
- +1License stated
Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 78.