SKILLEMALL.ai

CB triaging-security-incident-with-ir-playbook

Classifies and prioritizes security incidents using structured IR playbooks and SIEM/case-management queries (Splunk, TheHive) to determine severity, assign response teams, and initiate the appropriate response procedures. Use when a new SOC alert needs triage, multiple concurrent incidents require prioritization, or automated triage rules need validation or tuning.

mukul975/Anthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills Agent Skills author: mukul975 Apache-2.0 8 files · 2 scripts body ≈ 2 027 tokens Open the sourcegithub.com↗ analyzed 5 d ago

Classifies and prioritizes security incidents using structured IR playbooks and SIEM/case-management queries (Splunk, TheHive) to determine severity, assign…

As a process B 70/100 · Nearly there — weak spots: when it triggers, failures and branches, progress reporting

ProcedureInfrastructuretype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
JSON
Technical rating
C
81/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
83
Quality 40%
78
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
B
70/100
Nearly there
Failures and branches w 10
0
Progress reporting w 2
0
When it triggers w 12
20
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

How to improve

    For the model run — optional
    • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
    • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

    Guard findings · 17

    ✓ No critical or high findings

    Medium and low: 17
    • low Risky intent intent-offensive-security assets/template.md:54
      Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)
      - [ ] Ransomware
    • low Risky intent intent-offensive-security assets/template.md:62
      Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)
      - [ ] Privilege Escalation
    • low Risky intent intent-offensive-security references/api-reference.md:7
      Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)
      | Malware | trojan, ransomware, c2, beacon | High | malware-infection-playbook |
    • low Risky intent intent-offensive-security references/api-reference.md:10
      Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)
      | Unauthorized Access | brute force, lateral movement | High | unauthorized-access-playbook |
    • low Risky intent intent-offensive-security references/standards.md:21
      Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)
      | CAT 1 - Unauthorized Access | Individual gains access without permission | Compromised credentials, privilege escalation |
    • low Risky intent intent-offensive-security references/standards.md:23
      Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use) (detector / deny-list definition)
      | CAT 3 - Malicious Code | Infection by malware | Virus, worm, trojan, ransomware |
      detector
    • low Risky intent intent-offensive-security references/workflows.md:29
      Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)
      |-- Ransomware --> Ransomware playbook
    • low Risky intent intent-offensive-security references/workflows.md:74
      Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)
      | SIEM - Authentication anomaly | Account Compromise | Verify account, check lateral movement |
    • low Risky intent intent-offensive-security references/workflows.md:85
      Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)
      | Privilege Escalation (TA0004) | Privilege Escalation | P1 |
    • low Risky intent intent-offensive-security references/workflows.md:89
      Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)
      | Lateral Movement (TA0008) | Lateral Movement | P1 |
    • low Risky intent intent-offensive-security references/workflows.md:92
      Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)
      | Impact (TA0040) | Ransomware/Destruction | P1 |
    • low Exfiltration net-credential-use SKILL.md:58
      Credential used in a network call (verify the destination is the intended service) (documentation of a security skill)
      curl -s -H "Authorization: Bearer $THEHIVE_API_KEY" \
      security skill
    • low Risky intent intent-offensive-security SKILL.md:92
      Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)
      # DoS/DDoS, Insider Threat, Ransomware, Account Compromise, Web Attack
    • low Risky intent intent-offensive-security SKILL.md:147
      Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use) (quoted — discussed, not commanded)
      "tags": ["ransomware", "triage-complete"],
      quoted
    • low Risky intent intent-offensive-security SKILL.md:173
      Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use) (detector / deny-list definition)
      "summary": "P1 Security Incident: Ransomware detected on PROD-DB-01",
      detector
    • low Risky intent intent-offensive-security SKILL.md:223
      Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)
      2. **Malware Detection on Endpoint**: AV/EDR quarantined malware. Verify quarantine success, check for lateral movement, assign P2 if persistence detected.
    • low Risky intent intent-offensive-security SKILL.md:226
      Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)
      5. **Privilege Escalation**: User gained admin rights unexpectedly. Verify if authorized change, check for exploitation, assign P1 if unauthorized.

    Files scanned: 8. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

    Against the Agent Skills spec

    • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "domain"
    • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "subdomain"
    • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "mitre_attack"
    • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "nist_csf"

    Process rating: all ten parameters 70/100

    • 0Failures and branches. Linear process with no failure handling
    • 0Progress reporting. Says nothing while it works
    • 20When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
    • 60Result and completion. Output format stated, no completion criterion
    • 70Inputs and preconditions. Inputs and preconditions are listed
    • 100Tools and files. No external tools needed
    • 100Steps. 21 steps
    • 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
    • 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 2027 tokens
    • 100Running it twice. No mutating operations

    Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

    Quality signals

    • +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
    • +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
    • -43 reference files, but SKILL.md never points to them: the model will not open them
    • -32 of 2 scripts are never mentioned in SKILL.md
    • +2Single-language instructions
    • +3Description length 368: enough signal without eating the budget
    • +4Structure: 15 headings
    • +3Step-by-step instructions: 21 items
    • +3Output format is stated explicitly
    • +4Has examples (7 code blocks)
    • +1License stated

    Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 78.