CB triaging-security-incident-with-ir-playbook
Classifies and prioritizes security incidents using structured IR playbooks and SIEM/case-management queries (Splunk, TheHive) to determine severity, assign response teams, and initiate the appropriate response procedures. Use when a new SOC alert needs triage, multiple concurrent incidents require prioritization, or automated triage rules need validation or tuning.
Classifies and prioritizes security incidents using structured IR playbooks and SIEM/case-management queries (Splunk, TheHive) to determine severity, assign…
As a process B 70/100 · Nearly there — weak spots: when it triggers, failures and branches, progress reporting
How to improve
- Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
- A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.
Guard findings · 17
✓ No critical or high findings
Medium and low: 17
-
low Risky intent
intent-offensive-securityassets/template.md:54Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)- [ ] Ransomware
-
low Risky intent
intent-offensive-securityassets/template.md:62Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)- [ ] Privilege Escalation
-
low Risky intent
intent-offensive-securityreferences/api-reference.md:7Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)| Malware | trojan, ransomware, c2, beacon | High | malware-infection-playbook |
-
low Risky intent
intent-offensive-securityreferences/api-reference.md:10Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)| Unauthorized Access | brute force, lateral movement | High | unauthorized-access-playbook |
-
low Risky intent
intent-offensive-securityreferences/standards.md:21Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)| CAT 1 - Unauthorized Access | Individual gains access without permission | Compromised credentials, privilege escalation |
-
low Risky intent
intent-offensive-securityreferences/standards.md:23Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use) (detector / deny-list definition)| CAT 3 - Malicious Code | Infection by malware | Virus, worm, trojan, ransomware |
detector -
low Risky intent
intent-offensive-securityreferences/workflows.md:29Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)|-- Ransomware --> Ransomware playbook
-
low Risky intent
intent-offensive-securityreferences/workflows.md:74Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)| SIEM - Authentication anomaly | Account Compromise | Verify account, check lateral movement |
-
low Risky intent
intent-offensive-securityreferences/workflows.md:85Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)| Privilege Escalation (TA0004) | Privilege Escalation | P1 |
-
low Risky intent
intent-offensive-securityreferences/workflows.md:89Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)| Lateral Movement (TA0008) | Lateral Movement | P1 |
-
low Risky intent
intent-offensive-securityreferences/workflows.md:92Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)| Impact (TA0040) | Ransomware/Destruction | P1 |
-
low Exfiltration
net-credential-useSKILL.md:58Credential used in a network call (verify the destination is the intended service) (documentation of a security skill)curl -s -H "Authorization: Bearer $THEHIVE_API_KEY" \
security skill -
low Risky intent
intent-offensive-securitySKILL.md:92Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)# DoS/DDoS, Insider Threat, Ransomware, Account Compromise, Web Attack
-
low Risky intent
intent-offensive-securitySKILL.md:147Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use) (quoted — discussed, not commanded)"tags": ["ransomware", "triage-complete"],
quoted -
low Risky intent
intent-offensive-securitySKILL.md:173Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use) (detector / deny-list definition)"summary": "P1 Security Incident: Ransomware detected on PROD-DB-01",
detector -
low Risky intent
intent-offensive-securitySKILL.md:223Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)2. **Malware Detection on Endpoint**: AV/EDR quarantined malware. Verify quarantine success, check for lateral movement, assign P2 if persistence detected.
-
low Risky intent
intent-offensive-securitySKILL.md:226Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)5. **Privilege Escalation**: User gained admin rights unexpectedly. Verify if authorized change, check for exploitation, assign P1 if unauthorized.
Files scanned: 8. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.
Against the Agent Skills spec
- note
frontmatter-keyunknown frontmatter key "domain" - note
frontmatter-keyunknown frontmatter key "subdomain" - note
frontmatter-keyunknown frontmatter key "mitre_attack" - note
frontmatter-keyunknown frontmatter key "nist_csf"
Process rating: all ten parameters 70/100
- 0Failures and branches. Linear process with no failure handling
- 0Progress reporting. Says nothing while it works
- 20When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
- 60Result and completion. Output format stated, no completion criterion
- 70Inputs and preconditions. Inputs and preconditions are listed
- 100Tools and files. No external tools needed
- 100Steps. 21 steps
- 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
- 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 2027 tokens
- 100Running it twice. No mutating operations
Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.
Quality signals
- +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
- +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
- -43 reference files, but SKILL.md never points to them: the model will not open them
- -32 of 2 scripts are never mentioned in SKILL.md
- +2Single-language instructions
- +3Description length 368: enough signal without eating the budget
- +4Structure: 15 headings
- +3Step-by-step instructions: 21 items
- +3Output format is stated explicitly
- +4Has examples (7 code blocks)
- +1License stated
Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 78.