CB triaging-security-incident
Performs initial triage of security incidents using the NIST SP 800-61r3 and SANS PICERL frameworks, classifying incident type, assigning priority by business impact, and routing to the appropriate response team. Use when a SIEM/EDR alert needs human classification, concurrent alerts must be prioritized, or a user report or threat-intel IOC match requires initial incident categorization.
Performs initial triage of security incidents using the NIST SP 800-61r3 and SANS PICERL frameworks, classifying incident type, assigning priority by business…
As a process B 68/100 · Nearly there — weak spots: failures and branches
What is at stake
The skill contains fragments that, in the wrong hands, cost money or data. Below: what the installer risks and what the author should do.
The skill contains commands that delete files, rewrite disks or execute code fetched from the network. The agent may run them without asking if it believes the instructions require it.
Replace destructive commands with safe equivalents that ask for confirmation, scope them to one folder, and stop piping curl into a shell: pin a version and a checksum.
How to improve
- Address the high-severity findings: each costs 18 safety points. If one is a false positive, add the rule id to guard.allow in spec.yaml.
- Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
- A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.
Guard findings · 7
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high Dangerous commands
cmd-encoded-execSKILL.md:76Executes a base64/encoded payload (documentation of a security skill)Process: powershell.exe -enc SQBF…...
security skill
Medium and low: 6
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low Risky intent
intent-offensive-securityreferences/api-reference.md:27Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)| Unauthorized Access | Credential compromise, privilege escalation |
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low Risky intent
intent-offensive-securityreferences/api-reference.md:29Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use) (detector / deny-list definition)| Malicious Code | Malware, ransomware, cryptominer |
detector -
low Risky intent
intent-offensive-securitySKILL.md:86Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)| Unauthorized Access | Compromised credentials, privilege escalation, IDOR |
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low Risky intent
intent-offensive-securitySKILL.md:88Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use) (detector / deny-list definition)| Malicious Code | Malware execution, ransomware detonation, cryptominer |
detector -
low Risky intent
intent-offensive-securitySKILL.md:98Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use) (detector / deny-list definition)Severity = f(Asset Criticality, Threat Type, Data Sensitivity, Lateral Movement Potential)
detector -
low Risky intent
intent-offensive-securitySKILL.md:100Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)Critical (P1): Crown jewel systems compromised, active data exfiltration, ransomware spreading
Files scanned: 4. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.
Against the Agent Skills spec
- note
frontmatter-keyunknown frontmatter key "domain" - note
frontmatter-keyunknown frontmatter key "subdomain" - note
frontmatter-keyunknown frontmatter key "mitre_attack" - note
frontmatter-keyunknown frontmatter key "d3fend_techniques" - note
frontmatter-keyunknown frontmatter key "nist_csf"
Process rating: all ten parameters 68/100
- 0Failures and branches. Linear process with no failure handling
- 50When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
- 60Tools and files. Uses tools (bash) that frontmatter does not declare
- 60Result and completion. Output format stated, no completion criterion
- 70Inputs and preconditions. Inputs and preconditions are listed
- 100Steps. 41 steps
- 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
- 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 2110 tokens
- 100Running it twice. Mutating operations check current state
- 100Progress reporting. Reports progress
Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.
Quality signals
- +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
- -41 reference files, but SKILL.md never points to them: the model will not open them
- -31 of 1 scripts are never mentioned in SKILL.md
- +2Single-language instructions
- +4Description says when NOT to use the skill
- +3Description length 390: enough signal without eating the budget
- +4Structure: 15 headings
- +3Step-by-step instructions: 41 items
- +3Output format is stated explicitly
- +4Has examples (4 code blocks)
- +1License stated
Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 82.