DB add-ollama-provider
Route a NanoClaw agent group to a local Ollama model instead of the Anthropic API. Ollama speaks the Anthropic API natively (v1/messages), so no provider code changes are needed — just env var overrides and a model setting. Use when the user wants to run their agent locally, cut API costs, or experiment with open-weight models. See docs/ollama.md for background.
Route a NanoClaw agent group to a local Ollama model instead of the Anthropic API.
As a process B 68/100 · Nearly there — weak spots: result and completion, progress reporting
What is at stake
The skill contains fragments that, in the wrong hands, cost money or data. Below: what the installer risks and what the author should do.
The skill contains commands that delete files, rewrite disks or execute code fetched from the network. The agent may run them without asking if it believes the instructions require it.
Replace destructive commands with safe equivalents that ask for confirmation, scope them to one folder, and stop piping curl into a shell: pin a version and a checksum.
How to improve
- Address the high-severity findings: each costs 18 safety points. If one is a false positive, add the rule id to guard.allow in spec.yaml.
- Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
- A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.
Guard findings · 3
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high Dangerous commands
cmd-persistenceSKILL.md:139Persistence mechanism (cron / launchd / scheduled task / autorun registry)launchctl unload ~/Library/LaunchAgents/$(launchd_label).plist
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high Dangerous commands
cmd-persistenceSKILL.md:140Persistence mechanism (cron / launchd / scheduled task / autorun registry)launchctl load ~/Library/LaunchAgents/$(launchd_label).plist
Medium and low: 1
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low Dangerous commands
cmd-privilegeSKILL.md:72Privilege escalation / world-writable permissions (quoted — discussed, not commanded)If it shows `chmod 755`, change it to `chmod 777` so any uid can write there.
quoted
Files scanned: 1. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.
Against the Agent Skills spec
✓ No remarks against the Agent Skills spec
Process rating: all ten parameters 68/100
- 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
- 0Progress reporting. Says nothing while it works
- 60Tools and files. Uses tools (bash, web) that frontmatter does not declare
- 70When it triggers. States when to use, but not when not to
- 70Inputs and preconditions. Inputs and preconditions are listed
- 85Steps. 9 steps, 1 vague phrases
- 100Failures and branches. 3 branches, has a failure section
- 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
- 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 1443 tokens
- 100Running it twice. Mutating operations check current state
- low The response is described with custom markup (4 tags): a typed call is more reliable
Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.
Quality signals
- +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
- +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
- +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
- -2localhost URLs: will not work for another user
- +1No license
- +2Single-language instructions
- +3Description length 364: enough signal without eating the budget
- +4Structure: 13 headings
- +3Step-by-step instructions: 9 items
- +4Has examples (10 code blocks)
Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 82.