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Install or refresh OneCLI as NanoClaw's gateway provider. Use when setup selects OneCLI, an existing OneCLI-backed install is migrated to the gateway seam, or its runtime, approval bridge, setup, and agent guidance must be restored from the in-tree package.

nanocoai/nanoclaw Agent Skills author: nanocoai MIT 22 files · 16 scripts body ≈ 842 tokens Open the sourcegithub.com↗ analyzed 11 h ago

Install or refresh OneCLI as NanoClaw's gateway provider.

As a process C 53/100 · Has gaps — weak spots: result and completion, when it triggers, inputs and preconditions

IntegrationAI and agentstype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
Runs in: Claude / Claude Code ChatGPT / Codex Gemini CLI Cursor GitHub Copilot / VS Code Qwen Code Kimi Code CLI Z.ai (GLM) DeepSeek (Deep Code) Mistral Vibe LangChain (deepagents) OpenClaw Goose OpenCode
JSON
Technical rating
C
78/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
74
Quality 40%
85
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
C
53/100
Has gaps
Result and completion w 14
0
Inputs and preconditions w 11
0
Failures and branches w 10
0
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

What is at stake

Medium-severity findings: the skill is probably honest, but read what alarmed the scanner.

Exfiltration medium severity

Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.

If you install

The instructions or scripts send data out: environment variables, keys, file contents, chat history. You may never notice, because the agent performs the upload as "part of the task".

For the author

If the upload is not needed for the task, remove it: catalogs flag such skills and delist them. If it is needed, name the destination explicitly, say what leaves the machine, and give the user a switch.

Dangerous commands medium severity

Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.

If you install

The skill contains commands that delete files, rewrite disks or execute code fetched from the network. The agent may run them without asking if it believes the instructions require it.

For the author

Replace destructive commands with safe equivalents that ask for confirmation, scope them to one folder, and stop piping curl into a shell: pin a version and a checksum.

How to improve

    For the model run — optional
    • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
    • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

    Guard findings · 6

    ✓ No critical or high findings

    Medium and low: 6
    • medium Exfiltration net-redirectable-api-key payload/src/gateway-providers/onecli.ts:29
      Helper sends the API key to a host configured by an environment variable — the key can be redirected to another server
      API key + configurable base URL from environment
    • medium Exfiltration net-redirectable-api-key scripts/auth.ts:111
      Helper sends the API key to a host configured by an environment variable — the key can be redirected to another server
      API key + configurable base URL from environment
    • medium Dangerous commands cmd-pipe-to-shell scripts/install-claude.sh:11
      Downloads and executes remote code from an unrecognised host (pipe to shell) (code comment)
      # the allowlisted unit; the curl | bash pipe lives inside it.
      comment
    • medium Dangerous commands cmd-pipe-to-shell-known-host scripts/install-claude.sh:32
      Pipe-to-shell installer from a well-known host (still executes remote code)
      curl -fsSL https://claude.ai/install.sh | bash
    • medium Exfiltration net-redirectable-api-key scripts/setup.ts:401
      Helper sends the API key to a host configured by an environment variable — the key can be redirected to another server
      API key + configurable base URL from environment
    • low Dangerous commands cmd-pipe-to-shell-known-host scripts/register-claude-token.sh:37
      Pipe-to-shell installer from a well-known host (still executes remote code) (string literal in code, not executed)
      echo "  curl -fsSL https://claude.ai/install.sh | bash" >&2
      code literal

    Files scanned: 22. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

    Against the Agent Skills spec

    ✓ No remarks against the Agent Skills spec

    Process rating: all ten parameters 53/100

    • 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
    • 0Inputs and preconditions. Does not say what the process needs to start
    • 0Failures and branches. Linear process with no failure handling
    • 0Progress reporting. Says nothing while it works
    • 20When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
    • 100Tools and files. No external tools needed
    • 100Steps. 4 steps
    • 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
    • 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 842 tokens
    • 100Running it twice. No mutating operations

    Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

    Quality signals

    • +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
    • +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
    • +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
    • -38 of 11 scripts are never mentioned in SKILL.md
    • +1No license
    • +2Single-language instructions
    • +3Description length 257: enough signal without eating the budget
    • +4Structure: 7 headings
    • +3Step-by-step instructions: 4 items
    • +4Has examples (6 code blocks)
    • +4Reference files are cited in the instructions (1 of 1)

    Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 85.