CD add-telegram
Add Telegram channel integration via Chat SDK.
Add Telegram channel integration via Chat SDK.
As a process D 43/100 · Unfinished process — References files that are not bundled: scripts/init-first-agent.ts
What is at stake
Medium-severity findings: the skill is probably honest, but read what alarmed the scanner.
Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.
The files contain someone else's key or token. If it is live, your agent will call third-party services under a stranger's identity; if it was revoked, the skill's scripts simply fail. Such a key often arrives with the author's whole workspace, personal data included.
The key is visible to everyone who downloaded the skill and has likely been copied by catalog-scanning bots already. Revoke it now, check bills and access logs, then reissue.
How to improve
- Say in the description WHEN to use the skill ("use when…", example requests): that is the agent's main cue.
- The text references files that are not there: add them or drop the references.
- Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
- A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.
Guard findings · 4
✓ No critical or high findings
Medium and low: 4
-
medium Secrets in code
secret-telegram-botapply-fixtures.json:11Telegram bot token (test fixture / example file; quoted — discussed, not commanded)"bot_token": "1234…AAA…"
fixturequoted -
medium Secrets in code
secret-telegram-botapply-fixtures.json:23Telegram bot token (test fixture / example file; quoted — discussed, not commanded)"bot_token": "1234…AAA…",
fixturequoted -
low Exfiltration
exfil-webhook-urlSKILL.md:138Webhook / callback URL commonly used for exfiltration (verify the destination) (placeholder value)curl -sf https://api.telegram.org/bot{{bot_token}}/getMe | jq -er '.result.username'placeholder -
low Exfiltration
exfil-webhook-urlSKILL.md:176Webhook / callback URL commonly used for exfiltration (verify the destination) (placeholder value)curl -sf https://api.telegram.org/bot{{bot_token_2}}/getMe | jq -er '.result.username'placeholder
Files scanned: 3. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.
Against the Agent Skills spec
- warning
description-no-whendescription does not say WHEN to use the skill (no "use when") - warning
missing-refreference to a missing file: scripts/init-first-agent.ts
Process rating: all ten parameters 43/100
- 0Tools and files. 1 referenced file(s) missing: scripts/init-first-agent.ts
- 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
- 0Inputs and preconditions. Does not say what the process needs to start
- 20When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
- 70Execution cost. Instruction body is 4093 tokens
- 85Steps. 8 steps, 1 vague phrases
- 100Failures and branches. 1 branches, has a failure section
- 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
- 100Running it twice. Mutating operations check current state
- 100Progress reporting. Reports progress
- medium Safety rules and hard prohibitions inside a skill: they belong in the system prompt, here they protect nothing
- low The response is described with custom markup (14 tags): a typed call is more reliable
Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.
Quality signals
- +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
- +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
- +3Description length 46: 120–800 characters recommended
- +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
- +1No license
- +2Single-language instructions
- +4Structure: 15 headings
- +3Step-by-step instructions: 8 items
- +4Has examples (29 code blocks)
Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 63.