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notque/vexjoy-agent Agent Skills author: notque MIT 32 files · 5 scripts body ≈ 1 992 tokens Open the sourcegithub.com↗ analyzed 7 d ago

Pull request lifecycle: commit, codex review, sync, review, fix, status, cleanup, and PR mining.

As a process C 58/100 · Has gaps — weak spots: result and completion, when it triggers, inputs and preconditions

ProcedureGitHubSoftware developmenttype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
Runs in: Claude / Claude Code ChatGPT / Codex Gemini CLI Cursor GitHub Copilot / VS Code Qwen Code Kimi Code CLI Z.ai (GLM) DeepSeek (Deep Code) Mistral Vibe LangChain (deepagents) OpenClaw Goose OpenCode
JSON
Technical rating
C
87/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
85
Quality 40%
89
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
C
58/100
Has gaps
Result and completion w 14
0
Inputs and preconditions w 11
0
When it triggers w 12
20
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

What is at stake

Medium-severity findings: the skill is probably honest, but read what alarmed the scanner.

Dangerous commands medium severity

Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.

If you install

The skill contains commands that delete files, rewrite disks or execute code fetched from the network. The agent may run them without asking if it believes the instructions require it.

For the author

Replace destructive commands with safe equivalents that ask for confirmation, scope them to one folder, and stop piping curl into a shell: pin a version and a checksum.

Exfiltration medium severity

Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.

If you install

The instructions or scripts send data out: environment variables, keys, file contents, chat history. You may never notice, because the agent performs the upload as "part of the task".

For the author

If the upload is not needed for the task, remove it: catalogs flag such skills and delist them. If it is needed, name the destination explicitly, say what leaves the machine, and give the user a switch.

Broad scope medium severity

Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.

If you install

The skill asks for more than the task needs: broad tool access, credential environment variables, binaries. Every extra permission widens the damage from a mistake or a compromise.

For the author

Narrow allowed-tools and the variable list to the minimum; replace binaries with readable sources or scripts.

How to improve

    For the model run — optional
    • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
    • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

    Guard findings · 3

    ✓ No critical or high findings

    Medium and low: 3
    • medium Dangerous commands cmd-eval-dynamic references/codex-review-preferred-patterns.md:303
      Dynamic code execution from decoded/untrusted input
      os.system(f"process {user_input}")  # injection if user_input contains ; or |
    • medium Exfiltration net-credential-use references/reviewer-usernames.md:48
      Credential used in a network call (verify the destination is the intended service)
      curl -H "Authorization: token $GITHUB_TOKEN" \
    • medium Broad scope meta-broad-allowed-tools SKILL.md:1
      Broad tool permissions pre-approved: Bash
      allowed-tools: Bash Read Write Edit Grep Glob Task Skill AskUserQuestion

    Files scanned: 32. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

    Against the Agent Skills spec

    • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "routing"

    Process rating: all ten parameters 58/100

    • 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
    • 0Inputs and preconditions. Does not say what the process needs to start
    • 20When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
    • 30Running it twice. 40 mutating operations with no state check
    • 50Failures and branches. 0 branches, has a failure section
    • 100Tools and files. Tools declared in frontmatter
    • 100Steps. 12 steps
    • 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
    • 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 1992 tokens
    • 100Progress reporting. Reports progress

    Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

    Quality signals

    • +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
    • +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
    • -35 of 5 scripts are never mentioned in SKILL.md
    • +1No license
    • +2Single-language instructions
    • +5Description quotes 9 example trigger phrases
    • +3Description length 485: enough signal without eating the budget
    • +4Structure: 11 headings
    • +3Step-by-step instructions: 12 items
    • +4Has examples (3 code blocks)
    • +4Reference files are cited in the instructions (25 of 26)

    Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 89.