CF security
Security: review git changes for vulnerabilities, threat-model a system's attack surface, audit supply-chain risks.
Security: review git changes for vulnerabilities, threat-model a system's attack surface, audit supply-chain risks.
As a process F 38/100 · Will not run — References files that are not bundled: scripts/security-review-scan.py
What is at stake
Medium-severity findings: the skill is probably honest, but read what alarmed the scanner.
Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.
The skill asks for more than the task needs: broad tool access, credential environment variables, binaries. Every extra permission widens the damage from a mistake or a compromise.
Narrow allowed-tools and the variable list to the minimum; replace binaries with readable sources or scripts.
How to improve
- Say in the description WHEN to use the skill ("use when…", example requests): that is the agent's main cue.
- The text references files that are not there: add them or drop the references.
- Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
- A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.
Guard findings · 3
✓ No critical or high findings
Medium and low: 3
-
medium Broad scope
meta-broad-allowed-toolsSKILL.md:1Broad tool permissions pre-approved: Bashallowed-tools: Read Write Bash Grep Glob Edit Task Agent
-
low Risky intent
intent-offensive-securityreferences/coverage.md:67Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)34. **Insecure file permissions on credential writes** — token/secret/lockfile written world-readable: no mode (umask 0o644), explicit 0o666/0o644, or write-then-chmod race. On multi-user hosts → disc
A further 1 matches are quotations in this security skill's documentation and are not counted as findings.
Files scanned: 3. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.
Against the Agent Skills spec
- warning
description-no-whendescription does not say WHEN to use the skill (no "use when") - warning
missing-refreference to a missing file: scripts/security-review-scan.py - note
frontmatter-keyunknown frontmatter key "routing"
Process rating: all ten parameters 38/100
- 0Tools and files. 1 referenced file(s) missing: scripts/security-review-scan.py
- 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
- 0Inputs and preconditions. Does not say what the process needs to start
- 0Progress reporting. Says nothing while it works
- 20When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
- 30Running it twice. 10 mutating operations with no state check
- 50Failures and branches. 0 branches, has a failure section
- 100Steps. 5 steps
- 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
- 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 2322 tokens
- medium Safety rules and hard prohibitions inside a skill: they belong in the system prompt, here they protect nothing
- low The response is described with custom markup (8 tags): a typed call is more reliable
Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.
Quality signals
- +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
- +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
- +3Description length 115: 120–800 characters recommended
- +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
- +1No license
- +2Single-language instructions
- +4Structure: 17 headings
- +3Step-by-step instructions: 5 items
- +4Has examples (3 code blocks)
- +4Reference files are cited in the instructions (2 of 2)
Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 66.