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CD elixir-way

Map mechanisms from any language or framework (Rails, Django, PHP, Node, Go, JVM, .NET, others) to idiomatic Elixir. Use when a rewrite or port needs verdicts, targets, guarantee checks or a translationese review.

Not recommendedcritical or high security findings
oliver-kriska/claude-elixir-phoenix Agent Skills author: oliver-kriska 15 files body ≈ 2 750 tokens Open the sourcegithub.com↗ analyzed 6 h ago

Map mechanisms from any language or framework (Rails, Django, PHP, Node, Go, JVM, .NET, others) to idiomatic Elixir. Use when a rewrite or port needs…

As a process D 48/100 · Unfinished process — weak spots: result and completion, when it triggers, inputs and preconditions

AnalyzerWriting and documentstype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
Runs in: Claude / Claude Code ChatGPT / Codex Gemini CLI Cursor GitHub Copilot / VS Code Qwen Code Kimi Code CLI Z.ai (GLM) DeepSeek (Deep Code) Mistral Vibe LangChain (deepagents) OpenClaw Goose OpenCode
JSON
Technical rating
C
81/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
77
Quality 40%
87
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
D
48/100
Unfinished process
Result and completion w 14
0
Inputs and preconditions w 11
0
Progress reporting w 2
0
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

What is at stake

The skill contains fragments that, in the wrong hands, cost money or data. Below: what the installer risks and what the author should do.

Exfiltration
If you install

The instructions or scripts send data out: environment variables, keys, file contents, chat history. You may never notice, because the agent performs the upload as "part of the task".

For the author

If the upload is not needed for the task, remove it: catalogs flag such skills and delist them. If it is needed, name the destination explicitly, say what leaves the machine, and give the user a switch.

Dangerous commands medium severity

Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.

If you install

The skill contains commands that delete files, rewrite disks or execute code fetched from the network. The agent may run them without asking if it believes the instructions require it.

For the author

Replace destructive commands with safe equivalents that ask for confirmation, scope them to one folder, and stop piping curl into a shell: pin a version and a checksum.

How to improve

  1. Address the high-severity findings: each costs 18 safety points. If one is a false positive, add the rule id to guard.allow in spec.yaml.
For the model run — optional
  • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
  • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

Guard findings · 2

  • high Exfiltration intent-browser-credential-store SKILL.md:34
    Accesses a browser credential / cookie store
    | Contract surface | `data` schema, files, encrypted values · `wire` URLs, cookies, JSON, webhooks, socket protocol · `operational` env vars, CLI, backups, ports |
Medium and low: 1
  • medium Dangerous commands cmd-persistence references/infrastructure.md:88
    Persistence mechanism (cron / launchd / scheduled task / autorun registry) (quoted — discussed, not commanded)
    `@daily`/`@reboot`. Non-UTC schedules need a timezone database (tz or tzdata).
    quoted

Files scanned: 15. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

Against the Agent Skills spec

  • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "effort"
  • note edit-residue the text marks something as outdated (lines 5, 16, 20, 26, 29, 43): check that old rules are not kept next to new ones — the full check reads the text for contradictions

Process rating: all ten parameters 48/100

  • 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
  • 0Inputs and preconditions. Does not say what the process needs to start
  • 0Progress reporting. Says nothing while it works
  • 20When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
  • 30Running it twice. 9 mutating operations with no state check
  • 50Failures and branches. 0 branches, has a failure section
  • 60Tools and files. Uses tools (node) that frontmatter does not declare
  • 100Steps. 40 steps
  • 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
  • 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 2750 tokens
  • medium Safety rules and hard prohibitions inside a skill: they belong in the system prompt, here they protect nothing

Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

Quality signals

  • +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
  • +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
  • +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
  • +1No license
  • +2Single-language instructions
  • +3Description length 213: enough signal without eating the budget
  • +4Structure: 10 headings
  • +3Step-by-step instructions: 40 items
  • +4Has examples (1 code blocks)
  • +4Reference files are cited in the instructions (7 of 7)

Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 87.