CB cli-review
Runs a Greptile CLI review for the current local branch, installing or authenticating the CLI when needed, then summarizes JSON findings for the user. Use when the user wants Greptile feedback before opening a PR, outside a hosted PR review flow, or directly from a local checkout.
Runs a Greptile CLI review for the current local branch, installing or authenticating the CLI when needed, then summarizes JSON findings for the user.
As a process B 75/100 · Nearly there — weak spots: result and completion, inputs and preconditions
What is at stake
Medium-severity findings: the skill is probably honest, but read what alarmed the scanner.
Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.
The skill asks for more than the task needs: broad tool access, credential environment variables, binaries. Every extra permission widens the damage from a mistake or a compromise.
Narrow allowed-tools and the variable list to the minimum; replace binaries with readable sources or scripts.
Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.
The skill contains commands that delete files, rewrite disks or execute code fetched from the network. The agent may run them without asking if it believes the instructions require it.
Replace destructive commands with safe equivalents that ask for confirmation, scope them to one folder, and stop piping curl into a shell: pin a version and a checksum.
How to improve
- Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
- A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.
Guard findings · 2
✓ No critical or high findings
Medium and low: 2
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medium Broad scope
meta-broad-allowed-toolsSKILL.md:1Broad tool permissions pre-approved: Bash(curl:*)allowed-tools: Bash(git:*) Bash(greptile:*) Bash(command:*) Bash(curl:*) Bash(npm:*)
-
medium Dangerous commands
cmd-pipe-to-shellSKILL.md:47Downloads and executes remote code from an unrecognised host (pipe to shell) (the skill's own vendor host)curl -fsSL "https://greptile.com/cli/install" | sh
vendor-host
Files scanned: 1. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.
Against the Agent Skills spec
✓ No remarks against the Agent Skills spec
Process rating: all ten parameters 75/100
- 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
- 30Inputs and preconditions. Does not say what the process needs to start
- 70When it triggers. States when to use, but not when not to
- 100Tools and files. Tools declared in frontmatter
- 100Steps. 5 steps
- 100Failures and branches. 1 branches, has a failure section
- 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
- 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 418 tokens
- 100Running it twice. No mutating operations
- 100Progress reporting. Reports progress
Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.
Quality signals
- +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
- +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
- +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
- +2Single-language instructions
- +3Description length 281: enough signal without eating the budget
- +4Structure: 7 headings
- +3Step-by-step instructions: 5 items
- +4Has examples (8 code blocks)
- +1License stated
Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 85.