SKILLEMALL.ai

BC mobile-testing

Test native, React Native, hybrid, and Flutter mobile apps with Appium 3.x, Detox, Maestro, and Patrol. Covers device farm setup (BrowserStack, Sauce Labs), gesture simulation, deep link and cold-start testing, push notifications, biometric (Face ID) auth, offline/poor-network simulation, and iOS/Android permission dialog handling. Use when: "mobile test," "Appium," "Detox," "Maestro," "Patrol," "Flutter test," "iOS test," "Android test," "device farm," "deep link," "biometric," "Face ID," "permission dialog," "React Native test." Not for: device/browser matrix strategy in the abstract — use cross-browser-testing; app startup/memory/battery profiling depth — use performance-testing; mobile screenshot diffing — use visual-testing. Related: ci-cd-integration, cross-browser-testing, performance-testing, test-data-management, test-reliability.

petrkindlmann/qa-skills Agent Skills author: petrkindlmann MIT 5 files body ≈ 3 432 tokens Open the sourcegithub.com analyzed 2 d ago

Test native, React Native, hybrid, and Flutter mobile apps with Appium 3.x, Detox, Maestro, and Patrol. Covers device farm setup (BrowserStack, Sauce Labs)…

As a process C 53/100 · Has gaps — weak spots: result and completion, inputs and preconditions, failures and branches

IntegrationSoftware developmentInfrastructureData and analyticstype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
JSON
Technical rating
B
89/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
85
Quality 40%
95
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
C
53/100
Has gaps
Inputs and preconditions w 11
0
Failures and branches w 10
0
Progress reporting w 2
0
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

What is at stake

Medium-severity findings: the skill is probably honest, but read what alarmed the scanner.

Dangerous commands medium severity

Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.

If you install

The skill contains commands that delete files, rewrite disks or execute code fetched from the network. The agent may run them without asking if it believes the instructions require it.

For the author

Replace destructive commands with safe equivalents that ask for confirmation, scope them to one folder, and stop piping curl into a shell: pin a version and a checksum.

Exfiltration medium severity

Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.

If you install

The instructions or scripts send data out: environment variables, keys, file contents, chat history. You may never notice, because the agent performs the upload as "part of the task".

For the author

If the upload is not needed for the task, remove it: catalogs flag such skills and delist them. If it is needed, name the destination explicitly, say what leaves the machine, and give the user a switch.

How to improve

    For the model run — optional
    • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
    • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

    Guard findings · 3

    ✓ No critical or high findings

    Medium and low: 3
    • medium Dangerous commands cmd-pipe-to-shell references/detox-and-maestro.md:123
      Downloads and executes remote code from an unrecognised host (pipe to shell) (the skill's own vendor host)
      curl -Ls "https://get.maestro.mobile.dev" | bash
      vendor-host
    • medium Exfiltration net-credential-use references/device-farm.md:30
      Credential used in a network call (verify the destination is the intended service)
      curl -u "$BROWSERSTACK_USERNAME:$BROWSERSTACK_ACCESS_KEY" \
    • medium Dangerous commands cmd-pipe-to-shell SKILL.md:123
      Downloads and executes remote code from an unrecognised host (pipe to shell) (the skill's own vendor host)
      curl -Ls "https://get.maestro.mobile.dev" | bash
      vendor-host

    Files scanned: 5. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

    Against the Agent Skills spec

    • note edit-residue the text marks something as outdated (lines 63): check that old rules are not kept next to new ones — the full check reads the text for contradictions

    Process rating: all ten parameters 53/100

    • 0Inputs and preconditions. Does not say what the process needs to start
    • 0Failures and branches. Linear process with no failure handling
    • 0Progress reporting. Says nothing while it works
    • 30Running it twice. 20 mutating operations with no state check
    • 40Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
    • 50When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
    • 60Tools and files. Uses tools (bash, web) that frontmatter does not declare
    • 100Steps. 34 steps
    • 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
    • 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 3432 tokens
    • low 14 top-level sections: this looks like several domains in one skill

    Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

    Quality signals

    • +3Description length 851: 120–800 characters recommended
    • +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
    • +2Single-language instructions
    • +5Description quotes 14 example trigger phrases
    • +4Description says when NOT to use the skill
    • +4Structure: 14 headings
    • +3Step-by-step instructions: 34 items
    • +4Has examples (3 code blocks)
    • +4Reference files are cited in the instructions (4 of 4)
    • +1License stated

    Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 95.