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AC security-testing

Test application security against OWASP Top 10 (2025) with automated CI tooling: OWASP ZAP (DAST), dependency/supply-chain scanning (OSV-Scanner, SBOM, provenance), Semgrep SAST, auth/session tests (JWT, OAuth, RBAC), and XSS/CSRF/SQLi/SSRF Playwright patterns. Use when: "security test," "OWASP," "vulnerability," "ZAP," "XSS," "SSRF," "dependency scan," "auth testing," "OWASP LLM Top 10." Scope is automated scanning + negative-path security tests in CI, not manual penetration testing. Not for: mapping security controls to regulations (SOC 2, HIPAA, PCI, GDPR) — use compliance-testing; pipeline stage wiring and deploy gating mechanics — use ci-cd-integration; purely functional API auth/input tests with no attacker model — see api-testing; testing your product's own LLM features or defending the agent itself (prompt-injection detector, indirect injection, jailbreak red-teaming) — use ai-system-testing. Related: ci-cd-integration, compliance-testing, api-testing, shift-left-testing, ai-system-testing.

petrkindlmann/qa-skills Agent Skills author: petrkindlmann MIT 4 files body ≈ 4 575 tokens Open the sourcegithub.com↗ analyzed 2 d ago

Test application security against OWASP Top 10 (2025) with automated CI tooling: OWASP ZAP (DAST), dependency/supply-chain scanning (OSV-Scanner, SBOM…

As a process C 56/100 · Has gaps — weak spots: result and completion, inputs and preconditions, running it twice

ProcedurePlaywrightSecurityAI and agentstype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
Runs in: Claude / Claude Code ChatGPT / Codex Gemini CLI Cursor GitHub Copilot / VS Code Qwen Code Kimi Code CLI Z.ai (GLM) DeepSeek (Deep Code) Mistral Vibe LangChain (deepagents) OpenClaw Goose OpenCode
JSON
Technical rating
A
94/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
94
Quality 40%
93
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
C
56/100
Has gaps
Inputs and preconditions w 11
0
Progress reporting w 2
0
Running it twice w 4
30
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

How to improve

    For the model run — optional
    • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
    • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

    Guard findings · 6

    ✓ No critical or high findings

    Medium and low: 6
    • low Secrets in code secret-password-literal references/auth-tests.md:11
      Hard-coded password / key literal (may be an example) (test fixture / example file)
      data: { email: 'te…@….com', password: 'vali…rd1!' },
      fixture
    • low Risky intent intent-offensive-security references/owasp-tests.md:21
      Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use) (test fixture / example file)
      IDOR, vertical privilege escalation, CORS, and SSRF (now treated as an access-control failure when the server is induced to reach internal resources).
      fixture
    • low Risky intent intent-offensive-security references/owasp-tests.md:32
      Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use) (test fixture / example file)
      // Vertical privilege escalation: regular user hits admin endpoint
      fixture
    • low Secrets in code secret-password-literal references/owasp-tests.md:148
      Hard-coded password / key literal (may be an example) (test fixture / example file)
      data: { email: 'te…@….com', password: 'vali…rd1!' },
      fixture
    • low Risky intent intent-offensive-security SKILL.md:8
      Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use) (detector / deny-list definition)
      "auth testing," "OWASP LLM Top 10." Scope is automated scanning + negative-path security tests in CI, not manual penetration testing.
      detector
    • low Risky intent intent-offensive-security SKILL.md:45
      Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use) (detector / deny-list definition)
      1. **Security is continuous, not a phase.** Scans run in CI on every PR, not as a quarterly penetration test. A vulnerability caught on the PR that introduced it costs minutes; the same vulnerability
      detector

    Files scanned: 4. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

    Against the Agent Skills spec

    ✓ No remarks against the Agent Skills spec

    Process rating: all ten parameters 56/100

    • 0Inputs and preconditions. Does not say what the process needs to start
    • 0Progress reporting. Says nothing while it works
    • 30Running it twice. 10 mutating operations with no state check
    • 40Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
    • 50When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
    • 55Failures and branches. 1 branches
    • 60Tools and files. Uses tools (web, node) that frontmatter does not declare
    • 70Execution cost. Instruction body is 4575 tokens
    • 100Steps. 45 steps
    • 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
    • low 12 top-level sections: this looks like several domains in one skill

    Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

    Quality signals

    • +3Description length 1013: 120–800 characters recommended
    • +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
    • -2localhost URLs: will not work for another user
    • +2Single-language instructions
    • +5Description quotes 6 example trigger phrases
    • +4Description says when NOT to use the skill
    • +4Structure: 22 headings
    • +3Step-by-step instructions: 45 items
    • +4Has examples (1 code blocks)
    • +4Reference files are cited in the instructions (3 of 3)
    • +1License stated

    Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 93.