DC security-guardian
CLI security expert for RTK - command injection, shell escaping, hook security
CLI security expert for RTK - command injection, shell escaping, hook security
As a process C 62/100 · Has gaps — weak spots: result and completion, failures and branches, progress reporting
What is at stake
Medium-severity findings: the skill is probably honest, but read what alarmed the scanner.
Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.
The skill asks for more than the task needs: broad tool access, credential environment variables, binaries. Every extra permission widens the damage from a mistake or a compromise.
Narrow allowed-tools and the variable list to the minimum; replace binaries with readable sources or scripts.
How to improve
- Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
- A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.
Guard findings · 1
✓ No critical or high findings
Medium and low: 1
-
medium Broad scope
meta-broad-allowed-toolsSKILL.md:1Broad tool permissions pre-approved: Bashallowed-tools: Read Grep Glob Bash
Files scanned: 1. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.
Against the Agent Skills spec
- error
name-missingSKILL.md: frontmatter has no `name`
Process rating: all ten parameters 62/100
- 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
- 0Failures and branches. Linear process with no failure handling
- 0Progress reporting. Says nothing while it works
- 50When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
- 70Inputs and preconditions. Inputs and preconditions are listed
- 85Steps. 32 steps, 1 vague phrases
- 100Tools and files. Tools declared in frontmatter
- 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
- 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 3360 tokens
- 100Running it twice. No mutating operations
- medium Safety rules and hard prohibitions inside a skill: they belong in the system prompt, here they protect nothing
Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.
Quality signals
- +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
- +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
- +3Description length 78: 120–800 characters recommended
- +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
- +1No license
- +2Single-language instructions
- +4Structure: 20 headings
- +3Step-by-step instructions: 32 items
- +4Has examples (18 code blocks)
Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 51.