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CD harness-security-bench

Run `@metaharness/darwin security bench` (upstream "Darwin Shield" / ADR-155) — evolves a champion security-detection harness against a 10-vuln / 9-decoy corpus and grades it on TPR/FPR/patch-pass/repro/unsafe vs four baselines (B0 static, B1 LLM-single-pass, B2 fixed-agent, B3 Darwin-champion). Closest reference implementation for ruflo's own ADR-155 nightly self-learning security harness (PR

ruvnet/claude-flow Claude Code author: ruvnet MIT 1 file body ≈ 982 tokens Open the sourcegithub.com↗ analyzed 30 h ago

Run @metaharness/darwin security bench (upstream "Darwin Shield" / ADR-155) — evolves a champion security-detection harness against a 10-vuln / 9-decoy corpus…

As a process D 41/100 · Unfinished process — References files that are not bundled: ../../scripts/security-bench.mjs, scripts/security-bench.mjs

AnalyzerAI and agentsSoftware developmenttype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
Runs in: Claude / Claude Code ChatGPT / Codex Gemini CLI Cursor GitHub Copilot / VS Code Qwen Code Kimi Code CLI Z.ai (GLM) DeepSeek (Deep Code) Mistral Vibe LangChain (deepagents) OpenClaw Goose OpenCode
JSON
Technical rating
C
82/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
92
Quality 40%
66
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
D
41/100
Unfinished process
References files that are not bundled: ../../scripts/security-bench.mjs, scripts/security-bench.mjs
Tools and files w 18
0
Inputs and preconditions w 11
0
Failures and branches w 10
0
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

What is at stake

Medium-severity findings: the skill is probably honest, but read what alarmed the scanner.

Broad scope medium severity

Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.

If you install

The skill asks for more than the task needs: broad tool access, credential environment variables, binaries. Every extra permission widens the damage from a mistake or a compromise.

For the author

Narrow allowed-tools and the variable list to the minimum; replace binaries with readable sources or scripts.

How to improve

  1. Say in the description WHEN to use the skill ("use when…", example requests): that is the agent's main cue.
  2. The text references files that are not there: add them or drop the references.
For the model run — optional
  • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
  • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

Guard findings · 4

✓ No critical or high findings

Medium and low: 4
  • medium Broad scope meta-broad-allowed-tools SKILL.md:1
    Broad tool permissions pre-approved: Bash
    allowed-tools: Bash
  • low Risky intent intent-offensive-security SKILL.md:76
    Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)
    one of the active-pentest dimension's calls — its results become a
  • low Risky intent intent-offensive-security SKILL.md:81
    Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use) (quoted — discussed, not commanded)
    "dimension": "mcp-pentest",
    quoted
  • low Risky intent intent-offensive-security SKILL.md:91
    Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use) (quoted — discussed, not commanded)
    corpus, weight findings caught only by `mcp-pentest` higher.
    quoted

Files scanned: 1. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

Against the Agent Skills spec

  • warning description-no-when description does not say WHEN to use the skill (no "use when")
  • warning missing-ref reference to a missing file: ../../scripts/security-bench.mjs
  • warning missing-ref reference to a missing file: scripts/security-bench.mjs

Process rating: all ten parameters 41/100

Will not run. References files that are not bundled: ../../scripts/security-bench.mjs, scripts/security-bench.mjs
  • 0Tools and files. 2 referenced file(s) missing: ../../scripts/security-bench.mjs, scripts/security-bench.mjs
  • 0Inputs and preconditions. Does not say what the process needs to start
  • 0Failures and branches. Linear process with no failure handling
  • 0Progress reporting. Says nothing while it works
  • 20When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
  • 30Running it twice. 1 mutating operations with no state check
  • 60Result and completion. Output format stated, no completion criterion
  • 100Steps. 8 steps
  • 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
  • 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 982 tokens

Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

Quality signals

  • +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
  • +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
  • +1No license
  • +2Single-language instructions
  • +3Description length 396: enough signal without eating the budget
  • +4Structure: 6 headings
  • +3Step-by-step instructions: 8 items
  • +3Output format is stated explicitly
  • +4Has examples (2 code blocks)

Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 66.