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CC paper-review-lite

Run a pre-submission manuscript audit covering argument, numerics, references, writing, figures, methods, preregistration, and replication readiness. Add --codex for a cross-model pass in which Codex and Claude review independently and verify each other's findings.

scdenney/open-science-skills Agent Skills author: scdenney NOASSERTION 3 files body ≈ 8 444 tokens Open the sourcegithub.com↗ analyzed 5 d ago

Run a pre-submission manuscript audit covering argument, numerics, references, writing, figures, methods, preregistration, and replication readiness.

As a process C 62/100 · Has gaps — weak spots: inputs and preconditions, execution cost, progress reporting

AnalyzerAI and agentsSoftware developmenttype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
Runs in: Claude / Claude Code ChatGPT / Codex Gemini CLI Cursor GitHub Copilot / VS Code Qwen Code Kimi Code CLI Z.ai (GLM) DeepSeek (Deep Code) Mistral Vibe LangChain (deepagents) OpenClaw Goose OpenCode
JSON
Technical rating
C
85/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
96
Quality 40%
69
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
C
62/100
Has gaps
Inputs and preconditions w 11
0
Progress reporting w 2
0
Execution cost w 6
40
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

How to improve

  1. Say in the description WHEN to use the skill ("use when…", example requests): that is the agent's main cue.
  2. The SKILL.md body is over 5,000 tokens: move reference detail into references/ and load it when needed.
For the model run — optional
  • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
  • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

Guard findings · 4

✓ No critical or high findings

Medium and low: 4
  • low Risky intent intent-offensive-security SKILL.md:48
    Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use) (detector / deny-list definition)
    **Agent 1 — Content & Argument (Red Team primary)**: Read the full paper. Your posture is adversarial but fair: find every place the argument is weaker than the paper presents it to be. Check logical
    detector
  • low Risky intent intent-offensive-security SKILL.md:164
    Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use) (quoted — discussed, not commanded)
    Codex stays the lead and Claude Code's non-interactive CLI supplies the second model family. Two cohorts independently apply the § 2 specification to the same paper, then each verifies the other's fin
    quoted
  • low Risky intent intent-offensive-security SKILL.md:284
    Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)
    - You want **full adversarial pressure** — a dedicated Red Team whose personas (Breaker, Butcher, Shredder, Collector, Void) each attack the paper from a different angle, a Blue Team defence, separate
  • low Risky intent intent-offensive-security SKILL.md:296
    Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)
    | [`presubmit`](https://github.com/scdenney/presubmit) | ~30 stages, dedicated Red Team personas, Blue Team defence, math and code-replication audits, resumable, cost-tracked | Heaviest, separate Anth

Files scanned: 3. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

Against the Agent Skills spec

  • warning description-no-when description does not say WHEN to use the skill (no "use when")
  • warning body-long SKILL.md body ≈ 8444 tokens (recommended < 5000); move details to references/

Process rating: all ten parameters 62/100

  • 0Inputs and preconditions. Does not say what the process needs to start
  • 0Progress reporting. Says nothing while it works
  • 40Execution cost. Instruction body is 8444 tokens: crowds the task out of the window
  • 50When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
  • 60Tools and files. Uses tools (bash, web, python) that frontmatter does not declare
  • 60Result and completion. Output format stated, no completion criterion
  • 85Steps. 59 steps, 1 vague phrases
  • 100Failures and branches. 1 branches, has a failure section
  • 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
  • 100Running it twice. Mutating operations check current state
  • medium Safety rules and hard prohibitions inside a skill: they belong in the system prompt, here they protect nothing

Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

Quality signals

  • +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
  • +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
  • +1No license
  • +2Single-language instructions
  • +3Description length 265: enough signal without eating the budget
  • +4Structure: 18 headings
  • +3Step-by-step instructions: 59 items
  • +3Output format is stated explicitly
  • +4Has examples (4 code blocks)
  • +4Reference files are cited in the instructions (1 of 1)

Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 69.