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BD attack-chain

Authorized multi-stage attack-path planning and orchestration spanning reconnaissance, initial access, privilege escalation, lateral movement, and reporting. Entry point for full engagements and cross-phase operations.

sickn33/agentic-awesome-skills Agent Skills author: sickn33 MIT 5 files body ≈ 1 083 tokens Open the sourcegithub.com↗ analyzed 2 d ago

Authorized multi-stage attack-path planning and orchestration spanning reconnaissance, initial access, privilege escalation, lateral movement, and reporting.

As a process D 46/100 · Unfinished process — weak spots: result and completion, when it triggers, inputs and preconditions

ProcedureData and analyticsAI and agentsSecuritytype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
Runs in: Claude / Claude Code ChatGPT / Codex Gemini CLI Cursor GitHub Copilot / VS Code Qwen Code Kimi Code CLI Z.ai (GLM) DeepSeek (Deep Code) Mistral Vibe LangChain (deepagents) OpenClaw Goose OpenCode
JSON
Technical rating
B
78/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
72
Quality 40%
86
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
D
46/100
Unfinished process
Result and completion w 14
0
Inputs and preconditions w 11
0
Failures and branches w 10
0
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

The same skill appears in 2 more places: agentic-awesome-skills, agentic-awesome-skills

What is at stake

Medium-severity findings: the skill is probably honest, but read what alarmed the scanner.

Exfiltration medium severity

Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.

If you install

The instructions or scripts send data out: environment variables, keys, file contents, chat history. You may never notice, because the agent performs the upload as "part of the task".

For the author

If the upload is not needed for the task, remove it: catalogs flag such skills and delist them. If it is needed, name the destination explicitly, say what leaves the machine, and give the user a switch.

Dangerous commands medium severity

Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.

If you install

The skill contains commands that delete files, rewrite disks or execute code fetched from the network. The agent may run them without asking if it believes the instructions require it.

For the author

Replace destructive commands with safe equivalents that ask for confirmation, scope them to one folder, and stop piping curl into a shell: pin a version and a checksum.

How to improve

    For the model run — optional
    • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
    • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

    Guard findings · 20

    ✓ No critical or high findings

    Medium and low: 20
    • medium Exfiltration exfil-read-secret-files references/phases.md:281
      Reads credential / secret files (documentation of a security skill)
      cat /etc/shadow
      security skill
    • medium Dangerous commands cmd-persistence references/phases.md:396
      Persistence mechanism (cron / launchd / scheduled task / autorun registry) (documentation of a security skill)
      (crontab -l; echo "*/5 * * * * /tmp/.hidden/beacon") | crontab -
      security skill
    • low Risky intent intent-offensive-security references/attack-playbooks.md:34
      Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)
      5. 等待上线（C2 beacon）
    • low Risky intent intent-offensive-security references/attack-playbooks.md:79
      Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)
      ## Playbook 5: Bug Bounty / SRC 快速打点
    • low Risky intent intent-offensive-security references/lifecycle-checklist.md:3
      Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)
      > 对照社区 pentest skill 包（如 Orizon claude-code-pentest 六阶段）与本包 `attack-chain` + `ops` 整合。
    • low Risky intent intent-offensive-security references/lifecycle-checklist.md:4
      Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)
      > 来源启发：公开 Claude pentest lifecycle skills（2026-07 检索）；**命令与授权以本包 scope 为准**。
    • low Risky intent intent-offensive-security references/lifecycle-checklist.md:18
      Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)
      | 1 Recon | cie | pentest-tools | assets 列表 + timeline |
    • low Risky intent intent-offensive-security references/lifecycle-checklist.md:19
      Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)
      | 2 Enum/Vuln | cpe | pentest-tools / api-security | 候选 F-* 草稿 |
    • low Risky intent intent-offensive-security references/lifecycle-checklist.md:20
      Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)
      | 3 Validate | cpe | pentest-tools | E-* + validated Finding |
    • low Risky intent intent-offensive-security references/phases.md:193
      Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)
      ## 三、权限提升阶段（Privilege Escalation）
    • low Risky intent intent-offensive-security references/phases.md:271
      Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)
      ## 四、横向移动阶段（Lateral Movement）
    • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token references/phases.md:380
      High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (detector / deny-list definition)
      Query = "SELECT * FROM __InstanceModificationEvent WITHIN 60 WHERE TargetInstance ISA 'Win3…tem'"
      detector
    • low Dangerous commands cmd-cron-mention references/phases.md:396
      Mentions editing / listing crontab (documentation of a security skill)
      (crontab -l; echo "*/5 * * * * /tmp/.hidden/beacon") | crontab -
      security skill
    • low Dangerous commands cmd-background-process references/phases.md:414
      Starts a background / autostarted process (documentation of a security skill)
      systemctl enable update.service
      security skill
    • low Risky intent intent-offensive-security references/phases.md:485
      Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)
      # 确保 C2 beacon 已退出
    • low Risky intent intent-offensive-security SKILL.md:3
      Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use) (quoted — discussed, not commanded)
      description: "Authorized multi-stage attack-path planning and orchestration spanning reconnaissance, initial access, privilege escalation, lateral movement, and reporting. Entry point for full engagem
      quoted
    • low Risky intent intent-offensive-security SKILL.md:46
      Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use) (documentation table row)
      | "Bug Bounty 持续监控" | 需要自动化多阶段流程 |
      table
    • low Risky intent intent-offensive-security SKILL.md:53
      Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use) (quoted — discussed, not commanded)
      - 只做端口扫描 → 直接去 `pentest-tools/`
      quoted
    • low Risky intent intent-offensive-security SKILL.md:54
      Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use) (quoted — discussed, not commanded)
      - 只做 SQL 注入 → 直接去 `pentest-tools/`
      quoted
    • low Risky intent intent-offensive-security SKILL.md:72
      Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)
      ├── pentest-tools/     → 工具调用、漏洞利用

    Files scanned: 5. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

    Against the Agent Skills spec

    • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "risk"
    • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "source"
    • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "source_repo"
    • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "source_type"
    • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "date_added"
    • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "license_source"

    Process rating: all ten parameters 46/100

    • 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
    • 0Inputs and preconditions. Does not say what the process needs to start
    • 0Failures and branches. Linear process with no failure handling
    • 0Progress reporting. Says nothing while it works
    • 20When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
    • 60Tools and files. Uses tools (bash) that frontmatter does not declare
    • 100Steps. 22 steps
    • 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
    • 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 1083 tokens
    • 100Running it twice. No mutating operations

    Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

    Quality signals

    • +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
    • +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
    • +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
    • +2Single-language instructions
    • +3Description length 218: enough signal without eating the budget
    • +4Structure: 21 headings
    • +3Step-by-step instructions: 22 items
    • +4Has examples (2 code blocks)
    • +4Reference files are cited in the instructions (1 of 4)
    • +1License stated

    Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 86.