BC aws-penetration-testing
Provide comprehensive techniques for penetration testing AWS cloud environments. Covers IAM enumeration, privilege escalation, SSRF to metadata endpoint, S3 bucket exploitation, Lambda code extraction, and persistence techniques for red team operations.
Provide comprehensive techniques for penetration testing AWS cloud environments.
As a process C 58/100 · Has gaps — weak spots: result and completion, when it triggers, running it twice
The same skill appears in 2 more places: agentic-awesome-skills, agentic-awesome-skills
How to improve
- Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
- A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.
Guard findings · 11
✓ No critical or high findings
Medium and low: 11
-
low Risky intent
intent-offensive-securityreferences/advanced-aws-pentesting.md:1Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use) (test fixture / example file)# Advanced AWS Penetration Testing Reference
fixture -
low Risky intent
intent-offensive-securityreferences/advanced-aws-pentesting.md:12Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use) (test fixture / example file)- [VPC Enumeration & Lateral Movement](#vpc-enumeration--lateral-movement)
fixture -
low Risky intent
intent-offensive-securityreferences/advanced-aws-pentesting.md:383Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use) (test fixture / example file)## VPC Enumeration & Lateral Movement
fixture -
low Risky intent
intent-offensive-securityreferences/advanced-aws-pentesting.md:416Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use) (test fixture / example file)### Lateral Movement via VPC Peering
fixture -
low Risky intent
intent-offensive-securitySKILL.md:3Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use) (quoted — discussed, not commanded)description: "Provide comprehensive techniques for penetration testing AWS cloud environments. Covers IAM enumeration, privilege escalation, SSRF to metadata endpoint, S3 bucket exploitation, Lambda c
quoted -
low Risky intent
intent-offensive-securitySKILL.md:26Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)# AWS Penetration Testing
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low Risky intent
intent-offensive-securitySKILL.md:30Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)Provide comprehensive techniques for penetration testing AWS cloud environments. Covers IAM enumeration, privilege escalation, SSRF to metadata endpoint, S3 bucket exploitation, Lambda code extraction
-
low Risky intent
intent-offensive-securitySKILL.md:42Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)- IAM privilege escalation paths
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low Secrets in code
secret-high-entropy-tokenSKILL.md:134High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (quoted — discussed, not commanded)TOKEN=$(curl -X PUT -H "X-aw…ds: 21600" \
quoted -
low Exfiltration
net-credential-useSKILL.md:138Credential used in a network call (verify the destination is the intended service) (documentation of a security skill)curl -H "X-aw…en:$TOKEN" \
security skill -
low Risky intent
intent-offensive-securitySKILL.md:155Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)## Privilege Escalation Techniques
Files scanned: 2. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.
Against the Agent Skills spec
- note
frontmatter-keyunknown frontmatter key "risk" - note
frontmatter-keyunknown frontmatter key "source" - note
frontmatter-keyunknown frontmatter key "date_added"
Process rating: all ten parameters 58/100
- 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
- 20When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
- 30Running it twice. 4 mutating operations with no state check
- 50Failures and branches. 0 branches, has a failure section
- 60Tools and files. Uses tools (web, git, python) that frontmatter does not declare
- 70Inputs and preconditions. Inputs and preconditions are listed
- 100Steps. 19 steps
- 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
- 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 2659 tokens
- 100Progress reporting. Reports progress
- low 18 top-level sections: this looks like several domains in one skill
Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.
Quality signals
- +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
- +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
- +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
- +1No license
- +2Single-language instructions
- +3Description length 253: enough signal without eating the budget
- +4Structure: 34 headings
- +3Step-by-step instructions: 19 items
- +4Has examples (20 code blocks)
- +4Reference files are cited in the instructions (1 of 1)
Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 85.