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AC burp-suite-testing

Execute comprehensive web application security testing using Burp Suite's integrated toolset, including HTTP traffic interception and modification, request analysis and replay, automated vulnerability scanning, and manual testing workflows.

sickn33/agentic-awesome-skills Agent Skills author: sickn33 MIT 1 file body ≈ 2 881 tokens Open the sourcegithub.com↗ analyzed 2 d ago

Execute comprehensive web application security testing using Burp Suite's integrated toolset, including HTTP traffic interception and modification, request…

As a process C 58/100 · Has gaps — weak spots: result and completion, when it triggers, running it twice

IntegrationSecuritytype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
Runs in: Claude / Claude Code ChatGPT / Codex Gemini CLI Cursor GitHub Copilot / VS Code Qwen Code Kimi Code CLI Z.ai (GLM) DeepSeek (Deep Code) Mistral Vibe LangChain (deepagents) OpenClaw Goose OpenCode
JSON
Technical rating
A
92/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
99
Quality 40%
81
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
C
58/100
Has gaps
Result and completion w 14
0
When it triggers w 12
20
Running it twice w 4
30
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten
This is a copy of a skill from another catalog; the rating counts the canonical one: burp-suite-testing (sickn33/agentic-awesome-skills)

The same skill appears in 2 more places: agentic-awesome-skills, agentic-awesome-skills

How to improve

    For the model run — optional
    • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
    • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

    Guard findings · 1

    ✓ No critical or high findings

    Medium and low: 1
    • low Risky intent intent-offensive-security SKILL.md:120
      Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)
      | Hidden fields | `isAdmin=true` | Test privilege escalation |

    Files scanned: 1. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

    Against the Agent Skills spec

    • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "risk"
    • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "source"
    • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "date_added"

    Process rating: all ten parameters 58/100

    • 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
    • 20When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
    • 30Running it twice. 14 mutating operations with no state check
    • 50Failures and branches. 0 branches, has a failure section
    • 60Tools and files. Uses tools (web) that frontmatter does not declare
    • 70Inputs and preconditions. Inputs and preconditions are listed
    • 100Steps. 116 steps
    • 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
    • 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 2881 tokens
    • 100Progress reporting. Reports progress

    Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

    Quality signals

    • +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
    • +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
    • +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
    • +1No license
    • +2Single-language instructions
    • +3Description length 240: enough signal without eating the budget
    • +4Structure: 55 headings
    • +3Step-by-step instructions: 116 items
    • +4Has examples (6 code blocks)

    Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 81.