SKILLEMALL.ai

BC container-security-hardening

Harden Docker/container images and runtime deployments with secure base images, non-root users, CVE scanning, SBOM/signing, seccomp/AppArmor, and Kubernetes pod security controls. Use for Dockerfile security reviews, container CVEs, image scanning, distroless images, or production hardening.

sickn33/agentic-awesome-skills Agent Skills author: sickn33 MIT 5 files body ≈ 908 tokens Open the sourcegithub.com analyzed 2 d ago

Harden Docker/container images and runtime deployments with secure base images, non-root users, CVE scanning, SBOM/signing, seccomp/AppArmor, and Kubernetes…

As a process C 57/100 · Has gaps — weak spots: result and completion, when it triggers, failures and branches

AnalyzerDockerKubernetesSecuritytype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
JSON
Technical rating
B
89/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
94
Quality 40%
81
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
C
57/100
Has gaps
Failures and branches w 10
0
Progress reporting w 2
0
When it triggers w 12
20
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

The same skill appears in 2 more places: agentic-awesome-skills, agentic-awesome-skills

How to improve

    For the model run — optional
    • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
    • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

    Guard findings · 6

    ✓ No critical or high findings

    Medium and low: 6
    • low Dangerous commands cmd-privilege references/detailed-guide.md:420
      Privilege escalation / world-writable permissions (code comment; documentation of a security skill)
      --security-opt no-new-privileges:true \    # Prevent privilege escalation via setuid
      commentsecurity skill
    • low Risky intent intent-offensive-security references/detailed-guide.md:420
      Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)
      --security-opt no-new-privileges:true \    # Prevent privilege escalation via setuid
    • low Dangerous commands cmd-privilege references/detailed-guide.md:441
      Privilege escalation / world-writable permissions (documentation table row; documentation of a security skill)
      | `SETUID` / `SETGID` | Switch user identity | No — drop always |
      tablesecurity skill
    • low Exfiltration net-credential-use references/detailed-guide.md:901
      Credential used in a network call (verify the destination is the intended service) (documentation table row; documentation of a security skill)
      | Secret in `docker history` | `ENV` or `RUN curl -H "Bearer $TOKEN"` | Use `RUN --mount=type=secret` |
      tablesecurity skill
    • low Risky intent intent-offensive-security SKILL.md:88
      Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)
      - Do not treat the output as a substitute for environment-specific penetration testing or a formal security audit.

    A further 1 matches are quotations in this security skill's documentation and are not counted as findings.

    Files scanned: 5. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

    Against the Agent Skills spec

    • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "risk"
    • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "source"
    • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "date_added"

    Process rating: all ten parameters 57/100

    • 0Failures and branches. Linear process with no failure handling
    • 0Progress reporting. Says nothing while it works
    • 20When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
    • 30Running it twice. 3 mutating operations with no state check
    • 40Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
    • 60Tools and files. Uses tools (bash) that frontmatter does not declare
    • 70Inputs and preconditions. Inputs and preconditions are listed
    • 100Steps. 45 steps
    • 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
    • 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 908 tokens
    • medium Safety rules and hard prohibitions inside a skill: they belong in the system prompt, here they protect nothing

    Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

    Quality signals

    • +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
    • +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
    • +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
    • +4No input/output examples
    • +1No license
    • +2Single-language instructions
    • +3Description length 292: enough signal without eating the budget
    • +4Structure: 10 headings
    • +3Step-by-step instructions: 45 items
    • +4Reference files are cited in the instructions (1 of 3)

    Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 81.