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Reverse engineer EDR internals (user-mode hook tables, ETW, AMSI) and study bypass techniques such as direct syscalls, Hell's Gate, and call-stack spoofing. Lab-only red-team research.

sickn33/agentic-awesome-skills Agent Skills author: sickn33 MIT 4 files body ≈ 1 729 tokens Open the sourcegithub.com↗ analyzed 2 d ago

Reverse engineer EDR internals (user-mode hook tables, ETW, AMSI) and study bypass techniques such as direct syscalls, Hell's Gate, and call-stack spoofing.

As a process D 47/100 · Unfinished process — weak spots: result and completion, inputs and preconditions, failures and branches

ProcedureSoftware developmentSecuritytype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
Runs in: Claude / Claude Code ChatGPT / Codex Gemini CLI Cursor GitHub Copilot / VS Code Qwen Code Kimi Code CLI Z.ai (GLM) DeepSeek (Deep Code) Mistral Vibe LangChain (deepagents) OpenClaw Goose OpenCode
JSON
Technical rating
A
92/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
96
Quality 40%
86
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
D
47/100
Unfinished process
Result and completion w 14
0
Inputs and preconditions w 11
0
Failures and branches w 10
0
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

The same skill appears in 2 more places: agentic-awesome-skills, agentic-awesome-skills

How to improve

    For the model run — optional
    • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
    • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

    Guard findings · 4

    ✓ No critical or high findings

    Medium and low: 4
    • low Risky intent intent-offensive-security references/telemetry-blinding.md:346
      Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)
      然后按 `attack-chain/` 的 initial access 与 lateral movement 章节进入下一阶段。
    • low Risky intent intent-offensive-security SKILL.md:51
      Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use) (documentation table row)
      | 内网横向 / AD 攻击 | `pentest-tools/network-attack-defense.md` |
      table
    • low Dangerous commands cmd-execpolicy-bypass SKILL.md:200
      Runs PowerShell with execution policy bypassed (documentation of a security skill)
      powershell -NoProfile -ExecutionPolicy Bypass -File "<SKILL_ROOT>\skills\scripts\boot…ps1" -Capability @('pe-sieve','sysw…rs3','sysmon') -StartServices
      security skill
    • low Risky intent intent-offensive-security SKILL.md:212
      Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use) (quoted — discussed, not commanded)
      - `pentest-tools/network-attack-defense.md` — 内网横向时如何与本 skill 联动
      quoted

    Files scanned: 4. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

    Against the Agent Skills spec

    • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "risk"
    • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "source"
    • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "source_repo"
    • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "source_type"
    • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "date_added"
    • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "license_source"

    Process rating: all ten parameters 47/100

    • 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
    • 0Inputs and preconditions. Does not say what the process needs to start
    • 0Failures and branches. Linear process with no failure handling
    • 0Progress reporting. Says nothing while it works
    • 30Running it twice. 1 mutating operations with no state check
    • 50When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
    • 60Tools and files. Uses tools (bash, git) that frontmatter does not declare
    • 100Steps. 41 steps
    • 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
    • 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 1729 tokens
    • low 11 top-level sections: this looks like several domains in one skill

    Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

    Quality signals

    • +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
    • +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
    • +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
    • +2Single-language instructions
    • +3Description length 184: enough signal without eating the budget
    • +4Structure: 22 headings
    • +3Step-by-step instructions: 41 items
    • +4Has examples (7 code blocks)
    • +4Reference files are cited in the instructions (3 of 3)
    • +1License stated

    Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 86.