CB hunt-csrf
Hunting skill for csrf vulnerabilities.
Hunting skill for csrf vulnerabilities.
As a process B 67/100 · Nearly there — weak spots: when it triggers
The same skill appears in 2 more places: agentic-awesome-skills, agentic-awesome-skills
What is at stake
Medium-severity findings: the skill is probably honest, but read what alarmed the scanner.
Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.
The instructions or scripts send data out: environment variables, keys, file contents, chat history. You may never notice, because the agent performs the upload as "part of the task".
If the upload is not needed for the task, remove it: catalogs flag such skills and delist them. If it is needed, name the destination explicitly, say what leaves the machine, and give the user a switch.
How to improve
- The SKILL.md body is over 5,000 tokens: move reference detail into references/ and load it when needed.
- Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
- A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.
Guard findings · 1
✓ No critical or high findings
Medium and low: 1
✓ Guard found no suspicious behaviour. 1 matches are attack strings quoted in this security skill's own documentation.
Files scanned: 1. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.
Against the Agent Skills spec
- warning
description-shortdescription under 40 chars: too little signal for triggering - warning
body-longSKILL.md body ≈ 5744 tokens (recommended < 5000); move details to references/ - note
frontmatter-keyunknown frontmatter key "risk" - note
frontmatter-keyunknown frontmatter key "source" - note
frontmatter-keyunknown frontmatter key "source_repo" - note
frontmatter-keyunknown frontmatter key "source_type" - note
frontmatter-keyunknown frontmatter key "date_added" - note
frontmatter-keyunknown frontmatter key "license_source" - note
frontmatter-keyunknown frontmatter key "sources" - note
frontmatter-keyunknown frontmatter key "report_count"
Process rating: all ten parameters 67/100
- 30When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
- 60Tools and files. Uses tools (web, node) that frontmatter does not declare
- 60Result and completion. Output format stated, no completion criterion
- 60Failures and branches. 2 branches
- 70Inputs and preconditions. Inputs and preconditions are listed
- 70Execution cost. Instruction body is 5744 tokens
- 85Steps. 72 steps, 1 vague phrases
- 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
- 100Running it twice. Mutating operations check current state
- 100Progress reporting. Reports progress
- low 15 top-level sections: this looks like several domains in one skill
- low The response is described with custom markup (4 tags): a typed call is more reliable
Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.
Quality signals
- +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
- +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
- +3Description length 39: 120–800 characters recommended
- +2Single-language instructions
- +4Structure: 36 headings
- +3Step-by-step instructions: 72 items
- +3Output format is stated explicitly
- +4Has examples (10 code blocks)
- +1License stated
Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 64.