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CC launch-check

Bounded pre-launch audit of a live URL for AI-built apps: exposed secret keys, open Supabase/Firebase tables, security headers, phone layout, search and speed.

Not recommendedcritical or high security findings
sickn33/agentic-awesome-skills Hermes author: sickn33 4 files · 3 scripts body ≈ 2 095 tokens Open the sourcegithub.com↗ analyzed 4 d ago

Bounded pre-launch audit of a live URL for AI-built apps: exposed secret keys, open Supabase/Firebase tables, security headers, phone layout, search and speed.

As a process C 60/100 · Has gaps — weak spots: result and completion, inputs and preconditions, failures and branches

AnalyzerSupabaseFirebaseStripePlaywrightSecuritytype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
Runs in: Claude / Claude Code Hermes Agent
JSON
Technical rating
C
78/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
75
Quality 40%
83
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
C
60/100
Has gaps
Result and completion w 14
0
Inputs and preconditions w 11
0
Failures and branches w 10
0
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

The same skill appears in 2 more places: agentic-awesome-skills, agentic-awesome-skills

What is at stake

The skill contains fragments that, in the wrong hands, cost money or data. Below: what the installer risks and what the author should do.

Obfuscation
If you install

The files contain invisible characters, encoded commands or comments hidden from readers but visible to the model. What you read differs from what the agent sees.

For the author

Remove invisible characters (they usually sneak in through copy-paste) and encoded strings: no catalog will pass them. Instructions for the model must be readable by a human too.

How to improve

  1. Address the high-severity findings: each costs 18 safety points. If one is a false positive, add the rule id to guard.allow in spec.yaml.
  2. For Hermes the description must be one sentence under 60 characters; move the conditions to a "When to Use" section.
For the model run — optional
  • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
  • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

Guard findings · 4

  • high Obfuscation uni-bidi-override scripts/launch_check.py:64
    Bidirectional override characters (Trojan Source) (2 occurrences)
    CTRL = re.compile(r"[\x00-\x08\x0b-\x1f\x7f-\x9f␀-␀␀-␀]")
Medium and low: 3
  • medium Obfuscation uni-bidi-isolate scripts/launch_check.py:64
    Bidirectional isolate characters (rarely legitimate outside RTL text) (2 occurrences)
    CTRL = re.compile(r"[\x00-\x08\x0b-\x1f\x7f-\x9f␀-␀␀-␀]")
  • low Risky intent intent-offensive-security SKILL.md:31
    Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)
    - Do not use for authenticated flows, API fuzzing or penetration testing (see Limitations).
  • low Risky intent intent-offensive-security SKILL.md:115
    Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)
    - Not a penetration test: no login flows, no API fuzzing, no server-side auth or paywall checks, no write tests.

Files scanned: 4. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

Against the Agent Skills spec

  • warning description-long-hermes description is 159 chars; the Hermes authoring standard requires ≤ 60 (one sentence, ending with a period)
  • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "risk"
  • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "source"
  • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "source_repo"
  • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "source_type"
  • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "date_added"
  • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "tools"
  • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "license_source"

Process rating: all ten parameters 60/100

  • 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
  • 0Inputs and preconditions. Does not say what the process needs to start
  • 0Failures and branches. Linear process with no failure handling
  • 0Progress reporting. Says nothing while it works
  • 30Running it twice. 2 mutating operations with no state check
  • 100Tools and files. Tools declared in frontmatter
  • 100Steps. 35 steps
  • 100When it triggers. States when to use and when not to
  • 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
  • 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 2095 tokens
  • medium Safety rules and hard prohibitions inside a skill: they belong in the system prompt, here they protect nothing

Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

Quality signals

  • +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
  • +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
  • +2Single-language instructions
  • +4Description says when NOT to use the skill
  • +3Description length 159: enough signal without eating the budget
  • +4Structure: 16 headings
  • +3Step-by-step instructions: 35 items
  • +4Has examples (4 code blocks)
  • +3All 3 scripts are documented
  • +1License stated

Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 83.