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BC mcp-server-security

Secure Model Context Protocol (MCP) servers with transport encryption, tool authorization, input validation, and audit logging for safe AI agent integrations.

sickn33/agentic-awesome-skills Agent Skills author: sickn33 MIT 2 files body ≈ 2 725 tokens Open the sourcegithub.com↗ analyzed 2 d ago

Secure Model Context Protocol (MCP) servers with transport encryption, tool authorization, input validation, and audit logging for safe AI agent integrations.

As a process C 57/100 · Has gaps — weak spots: result and completion, inputs and preconditions, failures and branches

IntegrationSecuritytype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
Runs in: Claude / Claude Code ChatGPT / Codex Gemini CLI Cursor GitHub Copilot / VS Code Qwen Code Kimi Code CLI Z.ai (GLM) DeepSeek (Deep Code) Mistral Vibe LangChain (deepagents) OpenClaw Goose OpenCode
JSON
Technical rating
B
91/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
99
Quality 40%
80
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
C
57/100
Has gaps
Result and completion w 14
0
Inputs and preconditions w 11
0
Failures and branches w 10
0
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

The same skill appears in 2 more places: agentic-awesome-skills, agentic-awesome-skills

How to improve

    For the model run — optional
    • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
    • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

    Guard findings · 1

    ✓ No critical or high findings

    Medium and low: 1
    • low Risky intent intent-offensive-security SKILL.md:37
      Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)
      | Unauthorized tool access      | Agent calls tools the user should not have access to          | Privilege escalation, data breach   |

    Files scanned: 2. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

    Against the Agent Skills spec

    • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "risk"
    • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "source"
    • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "source_repo"
    • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "source_type"
    • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "date_added"
    • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "license_source"

    Process rating: all ten parameters 57/100

    • 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
    • 0Inputs and preconditions. Does not say what the process needs to start
    • 0Failures and branches. Linear process with no failure handling
    • 0Progress reporting. Says nothing while it works
    • 30Running it twice. 3 mutating operations with no state check
    • 70When it triggers. States when to use, but not when not to
    • 100Tools and files. No external tools needed
    • 100Steps. 14 steps
    • 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
    • 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 2725 tokens

    Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

    Quality signals

    • +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
    • +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
    • +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
    • -4Absolute local paths (C:\Users, /home/…): not portable
    • -2localhost URLs: will not work for another user
    • +2Single-language instructions
    • +3Description length 158: enough signal without eating the budget
    • +4Structure: 16 headings
    • +3Step-by-step instructions: 14 items
    • +4Has examples (9 code blocks)
    • +4Reference files are cited in the instructions (1 of 1)
    • +1License stated

    Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 80.