DB offensive-osint
Operational arsenal for authorized external red-team and bug-bounty recon.
Operational arsenal for authorized external red-team and bug-bounty recon.
As a process B 67/100 · Nearly there — weak spots: execution cost, progress reporting
The same skill appears in 2 more places: agentic-awesome-skills, agentic-awesome-skills
What is at stake
Medium-severity findings: the skill is probably honest, but read what alarmed the scanner.
Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.
The files contain someone else's key or token. If it is live, your agent will call third-party services under a stranger's identity; if it was revoked, the skill's scripts simply fail. Such a key often arrives with the author's whole workspace, personal data included.
The key is visible to everyone who downloaded the skill and has likely been copied by catalog-scanning bots already. Revoke it now, check bills and access logs, then reissue.
How to improve
- The SKILL.md body is over 5,000 tokens: move reference detail into references/ and load it when needed.
- Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
- A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.
Guard findings · 15
✓ No critical or high findings
Medium and low: 15
-
medium Secrets in code
secret-private-keyreferences/helpers-and-automation.md:142Private key material (detector / deny-list definition; key header without key body)("RSA_PRIVKEY", SEV_CRITICAL, "private_key", r"-----BEGIN PRIVATE KEY----- …detectorheader only -
medium Secrets in code
secret-private-keyreferences/helpers-and-automation.md:143Private key material (detector / deny-list definition; key header without key body)("EC_PRIVKEY", SEV_CRITICAL, "private_key", r"-----BEGIN PRIVATE KEY----- …detectorheader only -
medium Secrets in code
secret-private-keyreferences/helpers-and-automation.md:144Private key material (detector / deny-list definition; key header without key body)("OPENSSH_PRIVKEY", SEV_CRITICAL, "private_key", r"-----BEGIN PRIVATE KEY----- …detectorheader only -
medium Secrets in code
secret-private-keyreferences/secret-patterns.md:38Private key material (key header without key body; documentation table row)| 25 | RSA Private Key | `-----BEGIN PRIVATE KEY----- …
header onlytable -
medium Secrets in code
secret-private-keyreferences/secret-patterns.md:39Private key material (key header without key body; documentation table row)| 26 | EC Private Key | `-----BEGIN PRIVATE KEY----- …
header onlytable -
medium Secrets in code
secret-private-keyreferences/secret-patterns.md:40Private key material (key header without key body; documentation table row)| 27 | OpenSSH Private Key | `-----BEGIN PRIVATE KEY----- …
header onlytable -
low Exfiltration
net-credential-usereferences/identity-fabric.md:215Credential used in a network call (verify the destination is the intended service) (destination host is a configured variable; documentation of a security skill)curl -sS -m 10 -I "https://${STEM}-my.sharepoint.com/personal/${USER_TOKEN}/Documents/" -w '%{http_code}\n'variable hostsecurity skill -
low Risky intent
intent-offensive-securityreferences/probes-and-wordlists.md:812Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use) (detector / deny-list definition)| **VMware ESXi** | `/sdk`, `/ui/`, `/folder` | CVE-…974 (heap overflow → ESXiArgs ransomware, KEV). |
detector -
low Secrets in code
secret-password-literalreferences/secret-validators.md:69Hard-coded password / key literal (may be an example) (placeholder value)x-api-key: sk-a…...
placeholder -
low Risky intent
intent-offensive-securityreferences/specialized-osint.md:18Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use) (test fixture / example file)### 29.1 Malware Analysis & Sandboxes
fixture -
low Risky intent
intent-offensive-securitySKILL.md:19Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)- external red team
-
low Risky intent
intent-offensive-securitySKILL.md:20Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)- red team external
-
low Risky intent
intent-offensive-securitySKILL.md:23Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)- bug bounty recon
-
low Risky intent
intent-offensive-securitySKILL.md:24Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)- bug bounty
-
low Risky intent
intent-offensive-securitySKILL.md:144Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)- bug bounty reference
Files scanned: 18. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.
Against the Agent Skills spec
- warning
body-longSKILL.md body ≈ 8740 tokens (recommended < 5000); move details to references/ - note
frontmatter-keyunknown frontmatter key "risk" - note
frontmatter-keyunknown frontmatter key "source" - note
frontmatter-keyunknown frontmatter key "source_repo" - note
frontmatter-keyunknown frontmatter key "source_type" - note
frontmatter-keyunknown frontmatter key "date_added" - note
frontmatter-keyunknown frontmatter key "license_source" - note
frontmatter-keyunknown frontmatter key "sources" - note
frontmatter-keyunknown frontmatter key "triggers" - note
edit-residuethe text marks something as outdated (lines 260, 264, 272, 273): check that old rules are not kept next to new ones — the full check reads the text for contradictions
Process rating: all ten parameters 67/100
- 0Progress reporting. Says nothing while it works
- 40Execution cost. Instruction body is 8740 tokens: crowds the task out of the window
- 50When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
- 50Failures and branches. 0 branches, has a failure section
- 60Tools and files. Uses tools (bash, web) that frontmatter does not declare
- 60Steps. 81 steps, 5 vague phrases
- 70Inputs and preconditions. Inputs and preconditions are listed
- 100Result and completion. Output format and completion criterion are stated
- 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
- 100Running it twice. Mutating operations check current state
- low 18 top-level sections: this looks like several domains in one skill
- low The response is described with custom markup (4 tags): a typed call is more reliable
Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.
Quality signals
- +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
- +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
- +3Description length 74: 120–800 characters recommended
- +2Single-language instructions
- +4Structure: 20 headings
- +3Step-by-step instructions: 81 items
- +3Output format is stated explicitly
- +4Has examples (1 code blocks)
- +4Reference files are cited in the instructions (15 of 15)
- +1License stated
Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 76.