SKILLEMALL.ai
GitHub ↗ RU Sign in

CF remote-gpu-trainer

Deploy, monitor, and debug long GPU jobs on RENTED/remote instances (AutoDL, RunPod, vast.ai, Lambda, Slurm, K8s): teardown/billing safety, spot resilience, resumable checkpointing, OOM/NaN triage.

sickn33/agentic-awesome-skills Agent Skills author: sickn33 MIT 43 files · 6 scripts body ≈ 5 600 tokens Open the sourcegithub.com↗ analyzed 2 d ago

Deploy, monitor, and debug long GPU jobs on RENTED/remote instances (AutoDL, RunPod, vast.ai, Lambda, Slurm, K8s): teardown/billing safety, spot resilience…

As a process F 47/100 · Will not run — References files that are not bundled: scripts/health_patrol.sh.template

ProcedureKubernetesOperations and projectstype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
Runs in: Claude / Claude Code ChatGPT / Codex Gemini CLI Cursor GitHub Copilot / VS Code Qwen Code Kimi Code CLI Z.ai (GLM) DeepSeek (Deep Code) Mistral Vibe LangChain (deepagents) OpenClaw Goose OpenCode
JSON
Technical rating
C
68/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
72
Quality 40%
63
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
F
47/100
Will not run
References files that are not bundled: scripts/health_patrol.sh.template
Tools and files w 18
0
Result and completion w 14
0
Inputs and preconditions w 11
0
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

The same skill appears in 2 more places: agentic-awesome-skills, agentic-awesome-skills

What is at stake

Medium-severity findings: the skill is probably honest, but read what alarmed the scanner.

Dangerous commands medium severity

Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.

If you install

The skill contains commands that delete files, rewrite disks or execute code fetched from the network. The agent may run them without asking if it believes the instructions require it.

For the author

Replace destructive commands with safe equivalents that ask for confirmation, scope them to one folder, and stop piping curl into a shell: pin a version and a checksum.

Exfiltration medium severity

Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.

If you install

The instructions or scripts send data out: environment variables, keys, file contents, chat history. You may never notice, because the agent performs the upload as "part of the task".

For the author

If the upload is not needed for the task, remove it: catalogs flag such skills and delist them. If it is needed, name the destination explicitly, say what leaves the machine, and give the user a switch.

Concealment medium severity

Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.

If you install

The skill tells the agent to hide things from you: not to show errors, not to mention actions, to report differently from what was done. You lose the ability to see what the agent really did.

For the author

Transparency beats a smooth answer. If the goal is to hide technical noise, ask the agent to "summarise briefly", not to "not mention".

How to improve

  1. The SKILL.md body is over 5,000 tokens: move reference detail into references/ and load it when needed.
  2. The text references files that are not there: add them or drop the references.
For the model run — optional
  • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
  • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

Guard findings · 12

✓ No critical or high findings

Medium and low: 12
  • medium Dangerous commands cmd-persistence profiles/generic-ssh.md:151
    Persistence mechanism (cron / launchd / scheduled task / autorun registry) (quoted — discussed, not commanded)
    reboots often, add an `@reboot` cron or a systemd unit that re-launches the detached queue.
    quoted
  • medium Exfiltration exfil-read-secret-files references/gotchas_universal.md:620
    Reads credential / secret files (detector / deny-list definition)
    security hooks (rightly) block scp-ing a whole `~/.netrc` (it carries other machines' credentials).
    detector
  • medium Exfiltration exfil-read-secret-files references/gotchas_universal.md:627
    Reads credential / secret files (detector / deny-list definition)
    grep -A 2 'machine api.wandb.ai' ~/.netrc | ssh <host> 'umask 077; cat > /root/.netrc && chmod 600 /root/.netrc'
    detector
  • medium Concealment en-hide-from-user references/training/distributed-launch.md:249
    Instruction to hide actions from the user (detector / deny-list definition)
    **Symptom**: bf16 FSDP run diverges where bf16 DDP was fine; or BN/positional buffers silently run in
    detector
  • low Dangerous commands cmd-background-process profiles/generic-ssh.md:120
    Starts a background / autostarted process (quoted — discussed, not commanded)
    `disown`. Always redirect stdin from `/dev/null` so the job never blocks reading the terminal.
    quoted
  • low Dangerous commands cmd-background-process profiles/generic-ssh.md:133
    Starts a background / autostarted process (quoted — discussed, not commanded)
    → Fix: launch inside `tmux` (or `nohup … & disown`) **before** the long run starts — not after it is
    quoted
  • low Exfiltration net-credential-use profiles/lambda.md:47
    Credential used in a network call (verify the destination is the intended service) (detector / deny-list definition)
    - **REST API** — `https://cloud.lambdalabs.com/api/v1`, auth `curl -u $LAMBDA_API_KEY:` (basic-auth,
    detector
  • low Exfiltration net-credential-use profiles/lambda.md:297
    Credential used in a network call (verify the destination is the intended service) (quoted — discussed, not commanded)
    via the console or `curl -u $LAMBDA_API_KEY: https://cloud.lambdalabs.com/api/v1/instances` — an Alert-
    quoted
  • low Exfiltration net-credential-use profiles/lambda.md:299
    Credential used in a network call (verify the destination is the intended service) (detector / deny-list definition)
    - **Capacity probe before launch:** `curl -u $LAMBDA_API_KEY: .../instance-types | jq '.data | to_entries[]
    detector
  • low Dangerous commands cmd-background-process references/gotchas_universal.md:77
    Starts a background / autostarted process (detector / deny-list definition)
    3. **SSH HUP** — a foreground (non-`nohup`/`tmux`/`setsid`) launch dies when its parent SSH drops.
    detector
  • low Exfiltration exfil-read-secret-files references/ssh_transport.md:175
    Reads credential / secret files (detector / deny-list definition; documentation table row)
    | ssh <alias> 'umask 077; cat > /root/.netrc && chmod 600 /root/.netrc'
    detectortable
  • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token references/training/checkpoint-resume.md:20
    High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential)
    - **Sharded checkpoints (multi-GPU)** — C5 FSDP…OOM · C6 FSDP-SHARDED_STATE_DICT · C7 DCP-(dcp.save/load) · C8 DeepSpeed-ZeRO-dir+zero…p32

Files scanned: 39. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

Against the Agent Skills spec

  • warning body-long SKILL.md body ≈ 5600 tokens (recommended < 5000); move details to references/
  • warning missing-ref reference to a missing file: scripts/health_patrol.sh.template
  • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "risk"
  • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "source"
  • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "source_type"
  • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "source_repo"
  • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "date_added"
  • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "license_source"

Process rating: all ten parameters 47/100

Will not run. References files that are not bundled: scripts/health_patrol.sh.template
  • 0Tools and files. 1 referenced file(s) missing: scripts/health_patrol.sh.template
  • 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
  • 0Inputs and preconditions. Does not say what the process needs to start
  • 50Failures and branches. 0 branches, has a failure section
  • 70When it triggers. States when to use, but not when not to
  • 70Execution cost. Instruction body is 5600 tokens
  • 100Steps. 51 steps
  • 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
  • 100Running it twice. Mutating operations check current state
  • 100Progress reporting. Reports progress
  • medium Safety rules and hard prohibitions inside a skill: they belong in the system prompt, here they protect nothing
  • low 15 top-level sections: this looks like several domains in one skill
  • low The response is described with custom markup (4 tags): a typed call is more reliable

Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

Quality signals

  • +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
  • +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
  • +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
  • +4No input/output examples
  • -36 of 8 scripts are never mentioned in SKILL.md
  • +2Single-language instructions
  • +3Description length 197: enough signal without eating the budget
  • +4Structure: 16 headings
  • +3Step-by-step instructions: 51 items
  • +4Reference files are cited in the instructions (10 of 10)
  • +1License stated

Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 63.