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DC reverse-engineering

General reverse-engineering methodology for compiled, obfuscated, packed, or virtualized targets: GDB, Frida, angr, Unicorn, and Qiling workflows across languages and platforms, with anti-analysis countermeasures.

Not recommendedcritical or high security findings · low grade D
sickn33/agentic-awesome-skills Agent Skills author: sickn33 MIT 24 files body ≈ 2 982 tokens Open the sourcegithub.com↗ analyzed 2 d ago

General reverse-engineering methodology for compiled, obfuscated, packed, or virtualized targets: GDB, Frida, angr, Unicorn, and Qiling workflows across…

As a process C 51/100 · Has gaps — weak spots: result and completion, when it triggers, failures and branches

ProcedureGitHubSoftware developmenttype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
Runs in: Claude / Claude Code ChatGPT / Codex Gemini CLI Cursor GitHub Copilot / VS Code Qwen Code Kimi Code CLI Z.ai (GLM) DeepSeek (Deep Code) Mistral Vibe LangChain (deepagents) OpenClaw Goose OpenCode
JSON
Technical rating
D
50/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
26
Quality 40%
86
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
C
51/100
Has gaps
Result and completion w 14
0
Failures and branches w 10
0
Progress reporting w 2
0
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

The same skill appears in 2 more places: agentic-awesome-skills, agentic-awesome-skills

What is at stake

The skill contains fragments that, in the wrong hands, cost money or data. Below: what the installer risks and what the author should do.

Dangerous commands
If you install

The skill contains commands that delete files, rewrite disks or execute code fetched from the network. The agent may run them without asking if it believes the instructions require it.

For the author

Replace destructive commands with safe equivalents that ask for confirmation, scope them to one folder, and stop piping curl into a shell: pin a version and a checksum.

How to improve

  1. Address the high-severity findings: each costs 18 safety points. If one is a false positive, add the rule id to guard.allow in spec.yaml.
For the model run — optional
  • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
  • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

Guard findings · 19

  • high Dangerous commands cmd-pipe-to-shell references/nonpe-format-cookbook.md:106
    Downloads and executes remote code from an unrecognised host (pipe to shell)
    | **AS** | 循环 curl|sh / 远程拉脚本、非常规 C2 URL | 提 URL；分析下载体是否含格机命令；记临时路径 | E-android-wiper-backdoor | P0 | <!-- security-allowlist: curl-pipe-bash -->
  • high Dangerous commands cmd-pipe-to-shell references/nonpe-format-cookbook.md:225
    Downloads and executes remote code from an unrecognised host (pipe to shell)
    | **CM** | IEX (New-Object Net.WebClient).DownloadString(...) 或 [Reflection.Assembly]::Load(From…...) 无文件执行 | 提取下载 URL 检查域名/IP 信誉；PS 日志捕获内存加载代码；隔离网络模拟提取载荷 | E-ps-reflect-load | P0 | <!-- security
  • high Dangerous commands cmd-disable-security references/nonpe-format-cookbook.md:264
    Disables a security control (Defender, Gatekeeper, SIP, firewall, execution policy)
    | **DA** | 模块脚本含 setenforce 0 / mount -o rw,remount /system / chmod 777 敏感目录 | 检查 SELinux 操作（setenforce/chcon/restorecon）；检查系统分区挂载 + dm-verity 禁用；标记高危提权 | E-mg-privilege | P0 |
Medium and low: 16
  • medium Dangerous commands cmd-privilege references/nonpe-format-cookbook.md:264
    Privilege escalation / world-writable permissions
    | **DA** | 模块脚本含 setenforce 0 / mount -o rw,remount /system / chmod 777 敏感目录 | 检查 SELinux 操作（setenforce/chcon/restorecon）；检查系统分区挂载 + dm-verity 禁用；标记高危提权 | E-mg-privilege | P0 |
  • low Risky intent intent-offensive-security references/field-notes.md:52
    Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)
    - [Hash-Resolved Imports / No-Import Ransomware](#hash-resolved-imports--no-import-ransomware)
  • low Risky intent intent-offensive-security references/field-notes.md:259
    Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)
    ### Hash-Resolved Imports / No-Import Ransomware
  • low Risky intent intent-offensive-security references/field-notes.md:260
    Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use) (detector / deny-list definition)
    **Pattern:** Binary with zero visible imports resolves APIs via symbol name hashing at runtime. Skip the hash reversing — hook OpenSSL functions via `LD_PRELOAD` in Docker to capture AES keys directly
    detector
  • low Risky intent intent-offensive-security references/languages-compiled.md:200
    Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)
    **Pattern (see-two):** A Go-compiled C2 client has a UUID embedded via `-ldflags -X`. The C2 server uses mTLS for authentication. To enumerate other clients and their files, patch the UUID to register
  • low Risky intent intent-offensive-security references/languages-compiled.md:205
    Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)
    3. Register with the C2 server using the patched binary (mTLS certs are embedded or in distfiles)
  • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token references/languages-compiled.md:343
    High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (quoted — discussed, not commanded)
    swift demangle 's14M…_tF'
    quoted
  • low Risky intent intent-offensive-security references/nonpe-format-cookbook.md:162
    Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)
    | **DM** | AutoIt 作为 loader 执行进程空洞注入（process hollowing）：CallWindowProc/EnumWindows 回调 + shellcode + 注入合法进程（regsvcs.exe 等），释放 .NET 载荷（DarkGate / Snake Keylogger / Arec…nt2 模式） | 检查 DllCall/DllCallb
  • low Risky intent intent-offensive-security references/patterns-ctf.md:17
    Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)
    - [Hash-Resolved Imports / No-Import Ransomware (BSidesSF 2026)](#hash…026)
  • low Dangerous commands cmd-privilege references/patterns-ctf.md:343
    Privilege escalation / world-writable permissions (detector / deny-list definition)
    **Pattern (Zombie Lockbox):** A setuid binary uses `strcmp` for password validation. The expected password is visible via `strings` and works under GDB (which drops suid), but fails when run normally.
    detector
  • low Risky intent intent-offensive-security references/patterns-ctf.md:417
    Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)
    ## Hash-Resolved Imports / No-Import Ransomware (BSidesSF 2026)
  • low Risky intent intent-offensive-security references/patterns-ctf.md:432
    Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)
    // hook_crypto.c — captures AES key used by the ransomware
  • low Risky intent intent-offensive-security references/patterns-ctf.md:457
    Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)
    # Run in Docker container (ransomware may be destructive!)
  • low Risky intent intent-offensive-security references/patterns-ctf.md:459
    Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use) (quoted — discussed, not commanded)
    bash -c "LD_PRELOAD=./hook.so ./ransomware; xxd /tmp/aes_key.bin"
    quoted
  • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token references/platforms.md:113
    High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (quoted — discussed, not commanded)
    swift demangle 's14M…_tF'
    quoted
  • low Risky intent intent-offensive-security SKILL.md:70
    Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)
    - [patterns-ctf.md](references/patterns-ctf.md) - Competition-specific patterns (Part 1): hidden emulator opcodes, LD_PRELOAD key extraction, SPN static extraction, image XOR smoothness, byte-at-a-tim

Files scanned: 24. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

Against the Agent Skills spec

  • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "risk"
  • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "source"
  • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "source_repo"
  • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "source_type"
  • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "date_added"
  • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "license_source"

Process rating: all ten parameters 51/100

  • 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
  • 0Failures and branches. Linear process with no failure handling
  • 0Progress reporting. Says nothing while it works
  • 20When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
  • 30Running it twice. 1 mutating operations with no state check
  • 60Tools and files. Uses tools (bash, python, node) that frontmatter does not declare
  • 70Inputs and preconditions. Inputs and preconditions are listed
  • 100Steps. 60 steps
  • 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
  • 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 2982 tokens
  • low 18 top-level sections: this looks like several domains in one skill

Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

Quality signals

  • +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
  • +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
  • +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
  • +2Single-language instructions
  • +3Description length 213: enough signal without eating the budget
  • +4Structure: 19 headings
  • +3Step-by-step instructions: 60 items
  • +4Has examples (8 code blocks)
  • +4Reference files are cited in the instructions (14 of 23)
  • +1License stated

Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 86.