SKILLEMALL.ai

BB semgrep-rule-creator

Creates custom Semgrep rules for detecting security vulnerabilities, bug patterns, and code patterns. Use when writing Semgrep rules or building custom static analysis detections.

sickn33/agentic-awesome-skills Agent Skills author: sickn33 MIT 1 file body ≈ 1 729 tokens Open the sourcegithub.com analyzed 2 d ago

Creates custom Semgrep rules for detecting security vulnerabilities, bug patterns, and code patterns.

As a process B 68/100 · Nearly there — weak spots: result and completion, failures and branches, running it twice

AnalyzerSecuritySoftware developmenttype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
JSON
Technical rating
B
89/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
94
Quality 40%
81
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
B
68/100
Nearly there
Failures and branches w 10
0
Progress reporting w 2
0
Running it twice w 4
30
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

The same skill appears in 2 more places: agentic-awesome-skills, agentic-awesome-skills

What is at stake

Medium-severity findings: the skill is probably honest, but read what alarmed the scanner.

Broad scope medium severity

Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.

If you install

The skill asks for more than the task needs: broad tool access, credential environment variables, binaries. Every extra permission widens the damage from a mistake or a compromise.

For the author

Narrow allowed-tools and the variable list to the minimum; replace binaries with readable sources or scripts.

How to improve

    For the model run — optional
    • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
    • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

    Guard findings · 2

    ✓ No critical or high findings

    Medium and low: 2
    • medium Broad scope meta-broad-allowed-tools SKILL.md:1
      Broad tool permissions pre-approved: Bash
      allowed-tools: Bash Read Write Edit Glob Grep WebFetch

    A further 1 matches are quotations in this security skill's documentation and are not counted as findings.

    Files scanned: 1. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

    Against the Agent Skills spec

    • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "risk"
    • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "source"
    • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "date_added"

    Process rating: all ten parameters 68/100

    • 0Failures and branches. Linear process with no failure handling
    • 0Progress reporting. Says nothing while it works
    • 30Running it twice. 2 mutating operations with no state check
    • 40Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
    • 50When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
    • 70Inputs and preconditions. Inputs and preconditions are listed
    • 100Tools and files. Tools declared in frontmatter
    • 100Steps. 33 steps
    • 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
    • 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 1729 tokens
    • low 11 top-level sections: this looks like several domains in one skill
    • low The response is described with custom markup (8 tags): a typed call is more reliable

    Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

    Quality signals

    • +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
    • +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
    • +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
    • +1No license
    • +2Single-language instructions
    • +3Description length 179: enough signal without eating the budget
    • +4Structure: 12 headings
    • +3Step-by-step instructions: 33 items
    • +4Has examples (7 code blocks)

    Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 81.