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BA comfyui-gateway

REST API gateway for ComfyUI servers. Workflow management, job queuing, webhooks, caching, auth, rate limiting, and image delivery (URL + base64).

sickn33/agentic-awesome-skills Agent Skills author: sickn33 MIT 3 files body ≈ 3 665 tokens Open the sourcegithub.com↗ analyzed 2 d ago

REST API gateway for ComfyUI servers.

As a process A 81/100 · Runs to the end — weak spots: result and completion, running it twice

IntegrationPostgreSQLInfrastructuretype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
Runs in: Claude / Claude Code ChatGPT / Codex Gemini CLI Cursor GitHub Copilot / VS Code Qwen Code Kimi Code CLI Z.ai (GLM) DeepSeek (Deep Code) Mistral Vibe LangChain (deepagents) OpenClaw Goose OpenCode
JSON
Technical rating
B
82/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
82
Quality 40%
83
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
A
81/100
Runs to the end
Running it twice w 4
30
Result and completion w 14
40
Failures and branches w 10
50
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten
This is a copy of a skill from another catalog; the rating counts the canonical one: comfyui-gateway (sickn33/agentic-awesome-skills)

What is at stake

Medium-severity findings: the skill is probably honest, but read what alarmed the scanner.

Exfiltration medium severity

Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.

If you install

The instructions or scripts send data out: environment variables, keys, file contents, chat history. You may never notice, because the agent performs the upload as "part of the task".

For the author

If the upload is not needed for the task, remove it: catalogs flag such skills and delist them. If it is needed, name the destination explicitly, say what leaves the machine, and give the user a switch.

Dangerous commands medium severity

Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.

If you install

The skill contains commands that delete files, rewrite disks or execute code fetched from the network. The agent may run them without asking if it believes the instructions require it.

For the author

Replace destructive commands with safe equivalents that ask for confirmation, scope them to one folder, and stop piping curl into a shell: pin a version and a checksum.

How to improve

    For the model run — optional
    • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
    • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

    Guard findings · 6

    ✓ No critical or high findings

    Medium and low: 6
    • medium Exfiltration net-credential-use references/integration.md:610
      Credential used in a network call (verify the destination is the intended service)
      RESULT=$(curl -sf "$GATEWAY_URL/jobs/$JOB_ID" -H "X-API-Key: $API_KEY")
    • medium Exfiltration net-credential-use references/integration.md:614
      Credential used in a network call (verify the destination is the intended service)
      curl -sf "$GATEWAY_URL$URL" -H "X-API-Key: $API_KEY" -o "$OUTPUT"
    • medium Dangerous commands cmd-privilege references/troubleshooting.md:399
      Privilege escalation / world-writable permissions
      echo "192.168.1.50 my-webhook-server" | sudo tee -a /etc/hosts
    • low Secrets in code secret-password-literal references/troubleshooting.md:921
      Hard-coded password / key literal (may be an example) (quoted — discussed, not commanded)
      # Client 1: -H "X-API-Key: client1-key"
      quoted
    • low Secrets in code secret-password-literal references/troubleshooting.md:922
      Hard-coded password / key literal (may be an example) (quoted — discussed, not commanded)
      # Client 2: -H "X-API-Key: client2-key"
      quoted
    • low Exfiltration read-dotenv SKILL.md:91
      Reads a .env file
      cp .env.example .env

    Files scanned: 3. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

    Against the Agent Skills spec

    • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "risk"
    • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "source"
    • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "date_added"
    • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "tools"

    Process rating: all ten parameters 81/100

    • 30Running it twice. 3 mutating operations with no state check
    • 40Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
    • 50Failures and branches. 0 branches, has a failure section
    • 70Inputs and preconditions. Inputs and preconditions are listed
    • 100Tools and files. Tools declared in frontmatter
    • 100Steps. 67 steps
    • 100When it triggers. States when to use and when not to
    • 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
    • 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 3665 tokens
    • 100Progress reporting. Reports progress
    • medium Safety rules and hard prohibitions inside a skill: they belong in the system prompt, here they protect nothing
    • low 31 top-level sections: this looks like several domains in one skill

    Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

    Quality signals

    • +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
    • +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
    • +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
    • -2localhost URLs: will not work for another user
    • +1No license
    • +2Single-language instructions
    • +3Description length 146: enough signal without eating the budget
    • +4Structure: 32 headings
    • +3Step-by-step instructions: 67 items
    • +4Has examples (9 code blocks)
    • +4Reference files are cited in the instructions (2 of 2)

    Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 83.