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CD hunt-auth-bypass

Hunting skill for auth bypass vulnerabilities.

sickn33/agentic-awesome-skills Agent Skills author: sickn33 MIT 2 files body ≈ 6 738 tokens Open the sourcegithub.com↗ analyzed 4 d ago

Hunting skill for auth bypass vulnerabilities.

As a process D 46/100 · Unfinished process — weak spots: result and completion, when it triggers, inputs and preconditions

ProcedureWordPressShopifySecuritytype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
Runs in: Claude / Claude Code ChatGPT / Codex Gemini CLI Cursor GitHub Copilot / VS Code Qwen Code Kimi Code CLI Z.ai (GLM) DeepSeek (Deep Code) Mistral Vibe LangChain (deepagents) OpenClaw Goose OpenCode
JSON
Technical rating
C
86/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
94
Quality 40%
73
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
D
46/100
Unfinished process
Result and completion w 14
0
Inputs and preconditions w 11
0
Failures and branches w 10
0
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten
This is a copy of a skill from another catalog; the rating counts the canonical one: hunt-auth-bypass (sickn33/agentic-awesome-skills)

How to improve

  1. The SKILL.md body is over 5,000 tokens: move reference detail into references/ and load it when needed.
For the model run — optional
  • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
  • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

Guard findings · 6

✓ No critical or high findings

Medium and low: 6
  • low Risky intent intent-offensive-security references/details.md:13
    Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)
    ### Attack class 1 — YARP `UserOrClient` / `UserOrNone` privilege escalation
  • low Risky intent intent-offensive-security references/details.md:15
    Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)
    `Duende.BFF.Yarp` attaches access tokens to proxied routes via `WithAccessToken(TokenType.X)` metadata. The **misconfig pattern**: developer marks a route `UserOrClient` (use user token if logged in,
  • low Risky intent intent-offensive-security SKILL.md:38
    Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use) (detector / deny-list definition)
    Auth bypass is consistently one of the highest-paying vulnerability classes in bug bounty because it directly violates the most fundamental security control. High-value targets include:
    detector
  • low Risky intent intent-offensive-security SKILL.md:94
    Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)
    - Shopify Partner API exposure → cross-tenant privilege escalation risk
  • low Risky intent intent-offensive-security SKILL.md:346
    Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)
    **Scenario 3 — Cross-Portal Privilege Escalation via Shared Auth Backend**
  • low Risky intent intent-offensive-security SKILL.md:397
    Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use) (detector / deny-list definition)
    12. **Argo CD (Internet Bug Bounty) — JWT audience claim not validated (CVE-…482)** ([H1 #1889161](https://hackerone.com/reports/1889161))
    detector

Files scanned: 2. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

Against the Agent Skills spec

  • warning body-long SKILL.md body ≈ 6738 tokens (recommended < 5000); move details to references/
  • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "risk"
  • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "source"
  • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "source_repo"
  • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "source_type"
  • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "date_added"
  • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "license_source"
  • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "sources"
  • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "report_count"
  • note edit-residue the text marks something as outdated (lines 17, 130, 132, 134, 139, 141): check that old rules are not kept next to new ones — the full check reads the text for contradictions

Process rating: all ten parameters 46/100

  • 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
  • 0Inputs and preconditions. Does not say what the process needs to start
  • 0Failures and branches. Linear process with no failure handling
  • 20When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
  • 60Tools and files. Uses tools (bash) that frontmatter does not declare
  • 70Execution cost. Instruction body is 6738 tokens
  • 100Steps. 74 steps
  • 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
  • 100Running it twice. Mutating operations check current state
  • 100Progress reporting. Reports progress
  • low 14 top-level sections: this looks like several domains in one skill

Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

Quality signals

  • +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
  • +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
  • +3Description length 46: 120–800 characters recommended
  • +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
  • +2Single-language instructions
  • +4Structure: 16 headings
  • +3Step-by-step instructions: 74 items
  • +4Has examples (11 code blocks)
  • +4Reference files are cited in the instructions (1 of 1)
  • +1License stated

Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 73.