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CC hunt-ssrf

Hunting skill for ssrf vulnerabilities.

sickn33/agentic-awesome-skills Agent Skills author: sickn33 MIT 2 files body ≈ 4 381 tokens Open the sourcegithub.com↗ analyzed 5 d ago

Hunting skill for ssrf vulnerabilities.

As a process C 50/100 · Has gaps — weak spots: when it triggers, inputs and preconditions, failures and branches

ProcedureKubernetesAWSGoogle CloudAzureSecuritytype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
Runs in: Claude / Claude Code ChatGPT / Codex Gemini CLI Cursor GitHub Copilot / VS Code Qwen Code Kimi Code CLI Z.ai (GLM) DeepSeek (Deep Code) Mistral Vibe LangChain (deepagents) OpenClaw Goose OpenCode
JSON
Technical rating
C
88/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
96
Quality 40%
76
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
C
50/100
Has gaps
When it triggers w 12
0
Inputs and preconditions w 11
0
Failures and branches w 10
0
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten
This is a copy of a skill from another catalog; the rating counts the canonical one: hunt-ssrf (sickn33/agentic-awesome-skills)

How to improve

    For the model run — optional
    • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
    • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

    Guard findings · 4

    ✓ No critical or high findings

    Medium and low: 4
    • low Risky intent intent-offensive-security references/details.md:123
      Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)
      An attacker who could register a Kubernetes API extension server (metrics-server equivalent) returned `302 Location: http://127.0.0.1:6443/api/v1/secrets` responses to the aggregation layer. Because t
    • low Risky intent intent-offensive-security references/details.md:173
      Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)
      - **`cloud-iam-deep`** — SSRF is the canonical entry to cloud metadata service. Chain primitive: SSRF → IMDSv1 token theft → `cloud-iam-deep` privilege escalation reaches `iam:CreateUser` / `sts:Assum
    • low Exfiltration exfil-webhook-url SKILL.md:248
      Webhook / callback URL commonly used for exfiltration (verify the destination) (placeholder value)
      curl -s "https://target.com/api/preview?url=…"
      placeholder
    • low Exfiltration exfil-webhook-url SKILL.md:253
      Webhook / callback URL commonly used for exfiltration (verify the destination) (placeholder value)
      -d '{"url":"https://YOUR_ID.oast.pro"}'
      placeholder

    Files scanned: 2. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

    Against the Agent Skills spec

    • warning description-short description under 40 chars: too little signal for triggering
    • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "risk"
    • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "source"
    • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "source_repo"
    • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "source_type"
    • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "date_added"
    • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "license_source"
    • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "sources"
    • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "report_count"

    Process rating: all ten parameters 50/100

    • 0When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
    • 0Inputs and preconditions. Does not say what the process needs to start
    • 0Failures and branches. Linear process with no failure handling
    • 0Progress reporting. Says nothing while it works
    • 60Tools and files. Uses tools (web) that frontmatter does not declare
    • 60Result and completion. Output format stated, no completion criterion
    • 70Execution cost. Instruction body is 4381 tokens
    • 100Steps. 64 steps
    • 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
    • 100Running it twice. Mutating operations check current state
    • low The response is described with custom markup (3 tags): a typed call is more reliable

    Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

    Quality signals

    • +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
    • +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
    • +3Description length 39: 120–800 characters recommended
    • -2localhost URLs: will not work for another user
    • +2Single-language instructions
    • +4Structure: 26 headings
    • +3Step-by-step instructions: 64 items
    • +3Output format is stated explicitly
    • +4Has examples (14 code blocks)
    • +4Reference files are cited in the instructions (1 of 1)
    • +1License stated

    Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 76.