SKILLEMALL.ai

BC python-packaging

Comprehensive guide to creating, structuring, and distributing Python packages using modern packaging tools, pyproject.toml, and publishing to PyPI.

Not recommendedcritical or high security findings
sickn33/agentic-awesome-skills Agent Skills author: sickn33 MIT 2 files body ≈ 348 tokens Open the sourcegithub.com analyzed 30 h ago

Comprehensive guide to creating, structuring, and distributing Python packages using modern packaging tools, pyproject.toml, and publishing to PyPI.

As a process C 60/100 · Has gaps — weak spots: result and completion, failures and branches, running it twice

GeneratorSoftware developmenttype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
JSON
Technical rating
B
80/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
82
Quality 40%
77
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
C
60/100
Has gaps
Failures and branches w 10
0
Progress reporting w 2
0
Running it twice w 4
30
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten
This is a copy of a skill from another catalog; the rating counts the canonical one: python-packaging (sickn33/agentic-awesome-skills)

What is at stake

The skill contains fragments that, in the wrong hands, cost money or data. Below: what the installer risks and what the author should do.

Dangerous commands
If you install

The skill contains commands that delete files, rewrite disks or execute code fetched from the network. The agent may run them without asking if it believes the instructions require it.

For the author

Replace destructive commands with safe equivalents that ask for confirmation, scope them to one folder, and stop piping curl into a shell: pin a version and a checksum.

How to improve

  1. Address the high-severity findings: each costs 18 safety points. If one is a false positive, add the rule id to guard.allow in spec.yaml.
For the model run — optional
  • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
  • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

Guard findings · 1

  • high Dangerous commands cmd-install-from-url resources/implementation-playbook.md:673
    Installs a package from an untrusted URL / archive
    pip install dist/my_p…whl

Files scanned: 2. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

Against the Agent Skills spec

  • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "risk"
  • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "source"
  • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "date_added"

Process rating: all ten parameters 60/100

  • 0Failures and branches. Linear process with no failure handling
  • 0Progress reporting. Says nothing while it works
  • 30Running it twice. 2 mutating operations with no state check
  • 40Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
  • 50When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
  • 60Tools and files. Uses tools (python) that frontmatter does not declare
  • 70Inputs and preconditions. Inputs and preconditions are listed
  • 100Steps. 19 steps
  • 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
  • 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 348 tokens

Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

Quality signals

  • +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
  • +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
  • +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
  • +4No input/output examples
  • +1No license
  • +2Single-language instructions
  • +3Description length 148: enough signal without eating the budget
  • +4Structure: 6 headings
  • +3Step-by-step instructions: 19 items

Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 77.