SKILLEMALL.ai

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Secure-by-default environment variable management for Claude Code sessions.

sickn33/agentic-awesome-skills Agent Skills author: sickn33 MIT 1 file body ≈ 2 569 tokens Open the sourcegithub.com analyzed 2 d ago

Secure-by-default environment variable management for Claude Code sessions.

As a process B 75/100 · Nearly there — weak spots: result and completion

ProcedureGitHubDockerAWSAI and agentsInfrastructureSoftware developmenttype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
JSON
Technical rating
B
87/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
94
Quality 40%
76
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
B
75/100
Nearly there
Result and completion w 14
40
When it triggers w 12
50
Tools and files w 18
60
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten
This is a copy of a skill from another catalog; the rating counts the canonical one: varlock (sickn33/agentic-awesome-skills)

How to improve

    For the model run — optional
    • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
    • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

    Guard findings · 6

    ✓ No critical or high findings

    Medium and low: 6
    • low Exfiltration read-dotenv SKILL.md:42
      Reads a .env file (documentation of a security skill)
      cat .env | grep SECRET
      security skill
    • low Exfiltration read-dotenv SKILL.md:53
      Reads a .env file (documentation of a security skill)
      cat .env
      security skill
    • low Exfiltration read-dotenv SKILL.md:58
      Reads a .env file (documentation of a security skill)
      cat .env.schema
      security skill
    • low Exfiltration read-dotenv SKILL.md:201
      Reads a .env file (documentation of a security skill)
      cat .env.schema
      security skill

    A further 2 matches are quotations in this security skill's documentation and are not counted as findings.

    Files scanned: 1. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

    Against the Agent Skills spec

    • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "risk"
    • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "source"
    • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "date_added"

    Process rating: all ten parameters 75/100

    • 40Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
    • 50When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
    • 60Tools and files. Uses tools (bash, git, node) that frontmatter does not declare
    • 70Inputs and preconditions. Inputs and preconditions are listed
    • 100Steps. 26 steps
    • 100Failures and branches. 1 branches, has a failure section
    • 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
    • 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 2569 tokens
    • 100Running it twice. Mutating operations check current state
    • 100Progress reporting. Reports progress
    • medium Safety rules and hard prohibitions inside a skill: they belong in the system prompt, here they protect nothing
    • low 15 top-level sections: this looks like several domains in one skill

    Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

    Quality signals

    • +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
    • +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
    • +3Description length 75: 120–800 characters recommended
    • +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
    • -2localhost URLs: will not work for another user
    • +1No license
    • +2Single-language instructions
    • +4Structure: 44 headings
    • +3Step-by-step instructions: 26 items
    • +4Has examples (25 code blocks)

    Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 76.