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CB vmware-vcenter-attack

VMware vSphere / vCenter Server external attack matrix

sickn33/agentic-awesome-skills Agent Skills author: sickn33 MIT 1 file body ≈ 7 946 tokens Open the sourcegithub.com↗ analyzed 5 d ago

VMware vSphere / vCenter Server external attack matrix

As a process B 67/100 · Nearly there — weak spots: result and completion, progress reporting

IntegrationSecuritytype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
Runs in: Claude / Claude Code ChatGPT / Codex Gemini CLI Cursor GitHub Copilot / VS Code Qwen Code Kimi Code CLI Z.ai (GLM) DeepSeek (Deep Code) Mistral Vibe LangChain (deepagents) OpenClaw Goose OpenCode
JSON
Technical rating
C
85/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
95
Quality 40%
69
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
B
67/100
Nearly there
Result and completion w 14
0
Progress reporting w 2
0
Failures and branches w 10
55
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten
This is a copy of a skill from another catalog; the rating counts the canonical one: vmware-vcenter-attack (sickn33/agentic-awesome-skills)

How to improve

  1. The SKILL.md body is over 5,000 tokens: move reference detail into references/ and load it when needed.
For the model run — optional
  • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
  • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

Guard findings · 5

✓ No critical or high findings

Medium and low: 5
  • low Risky intent intent-offensive-security SKILL.md:84
    Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use) (detector / deny-list definition)
    | **CVE-…085** | ESXi 7.0/8.0 < specific patch | AD group "ESX Admins" auto-admin bypass | High — Domain takeover→ESXi RCE, exploited in ransomware ops |
    detector
  • low Risky intent intent-offensive-security SKILL.md:95
    Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)
    | **CVE-…992** | ESXi OpenSLP | Pre-auth use-after-free → RCE | Critical, ESXi ransomware vector |
  • low Risky intent intent-offensive-security SKILL.md:349
    Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)
    ### 8. CVE-…085 — ESXi Active Directory integration "ESX Admins" auth bypass (ransomware-favorite)
  • low Risky intent intent-offensive-security SKILL.md:353
    Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)
    - **Disclosure:** Reported by Microsoft Threat Intelligence; advisory VMSA…013 published 2024-06-25. **Microsoft Security Blog** documents pre-patch exploitation by **Storm-0506 (Black Basta), S
  • low Risky intent intent-offensive-security SKILL.md:354
    Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)
    - **References:** https://www.vmware.com/security/advisories/VMSA-2024-0013.html ; https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/blog/2024/07/29/ransomware-operators-exploit-esxi-hypervisor-vulnerability-f

Files scanned: 1. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

Against the Agent Skills spec

  • warning body-long SKILL.md body ≈ 7946 tokens (recommended < 5000); move details to references/
  • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "risk"
  • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "source"
  • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "source_repo"
  • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "source_type"
  • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "date_added"
  • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "license_source"
  • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "sources"
  • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "report_count"
  • note edit-residue the text marks something as outdated (lines 350, 366): check that old rules are not kept next to new ones — the full check reads the text for contradictions

Process rating: all ten parameters 67/100

  • 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
  • 0Progress reporting. Says nothing while it works
  • 55Failures and branches. 1 branches
  • 60Tools and files. Uses tools (bash) that frontmatter does not declare
  • 70Inputs and preconditions. Inputs and preconditions are listed
  • 70Execution cost. Instruction body is 7946 tokens
  • 100Steps. 94 steps
  • 100When it triggers. States when to use and when not to
  • 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
  • 100Running it twice. Mutating operations check current state
  • low 22 top-level sections: this looks like several domains in one skill

Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

Quality signals

  • +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
  • +3Description length 54: 120–800 characters recommended
  • +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
  • -4Absolute local paths (C:\Users, /home/…): not portable
  • +2Single-language instructions
  • +4Description says when NOT to use the skill
  • +4Structure: 34 headings
  • +3Step-by-step instructions: 94 items
  • +4Has examples (9 code blocks)
  • +1License stated

Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 69.